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Summary
Many decision-making models in the literature either use demand functions that
are defined only on some restricted domains, or demand functions which do not
reflect real market behavior.
In this work, we first argue that a complete reasonable system of demand func-
tions is necessary for multi-product markets. Then we formally construct a model
of piecewise smooth demand functions for a market of multiple products, using
a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). Based on this, we will introduce an
NCP constrained best response pricing problem for each seller involved in a pricing
game. Some properties of this demand system and pricing model are presented.
Under certain conditions, we will show that the complementarity constrained pric-
ing model can be simplified by eliminating the complementarity constraints. To
allow for the uncertainty of demand, a randomized version of our NCP constrained
pricing model will also be discussed.
viii
Summary ix
A very important and commonly considered issue in pricing games, is the exis-
tence of Nash Equilibrium pricing policies. Thus we complete our work with the
investigation of this issue for the various games we consider above.
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Introduction
This thesis is motivated by the fact that over a period of time, pricing has been
recognized as a significant tool used in the profit maximization of firms. Whether
it be applied to areas in Revenue Management or Supply Chain Management, it is
used in the daily operations of industries to manipulate demand, and to regulate
the production and distribution of goods and services.
In the past decades, extensive research has been conducted to produce many dif-
ferent pricing strategies. These include dynamic and fixed strategies (i.e., the price
is fixed over time), single and multiple product strategies, competitive strategies
and so on.
To assist the reader in understanding the vast pricing literature, we first provide a
general review of existing pricing models, explore some of their common theoretical
properties, and present some applications of pricing in the different industries, in
Chapter 1.
Much of the earlier research focused on the pricing of single products. But
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as more firms entered the markets, and due to the heterogeneous tastes of con-
sumers, it became necessary to incorporate product differentiation and competition
into pricing models. In these competitive and multi-product pricing models, the
demand-price relationships (or demand functions) of multiple products are among
the core ingredients. Hence, it is extremely important to consider a good model of
demand.
However, many decision-making models use either incomplete demand functions
which are defined only on a restricted domain, or functions that do not reflect
market reality. Indeed, in Chapter 2, we produce examples which show that in-
complete demand functions may lead to inferior pricing models. Thus we are driven
to study a complete, reasonable definition of demand functions. By formulating
the demand functions using a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP), our
purpose is served. Some properties of this demand system will also be presented.
The above proposed demand function leads us naturally to a new game-theoretic
pricing model, which we will introduce in Chapter 3. We consider an oligopolistic
market, where producers/sellers are playing a non-cooperative game to determine
prices of their products. With the above model of demand functions incorporated
into the best response problem of each producer/seller involved, we are led to an
NCP constrained optimization problem or a Mathematical Program with Equilib-
rium Constraints (MPEC) facing each producer/seller.
We will then explore some basic properties of the new pricing models. In partic-
ular, we show that, in some situations, the NCP constraints in these optimization
problems can be eliminated to obtain simplified models; the original models and
the simplified models are, in a certain sense, equivalent. The computations and
theoretical analyses are thus tremendously simplified. As a by-product, this equiv-
alence provides a rigorous justification for the pricing models introduced in several
Introduction 3
papers.
As in reality, it may be difficult to obtain perfect information about the demand
processes, we incorporate random demand into our pricing models to propose new
stochastic pricing models. We are thus faced with Stochastic Mathematical Pro-
grams with Equilibrium constraints, which is usually abbreviated to SMPEC.
In studying the theoretical properties of games, a challenging but commonly con-
sidered issue is the possible existence of Nash Equilibrium policies. Hence, the final
part of our work, in Chapter 4, focuses on the conditions under which Nash Equilib-
riums of games, involving our pricing models, can be shown. These include games
incorporating the original NCP constrained pricing models, the above-mentioned
simplified problems, and the stochastic models.
Chapter 1
A Review of Pricing Models
We begin our main discussion with an overview of Pricing Models. The importance
of good pricing strategies in business theory is clearly recognized, as can be seen
from the huge volume of pricing research done over the years. It is not possible
to list all existing models here. What we attempt to do is to provide a general
review of the most relevant work. The reader may refer to the papers discussed
for details and also the references therein for earlier related work. We concern
ourselves with papers where demands depend on prices. As the pricing decision
may be made jointly with other economic parameters, in this chapter, we will not
only review models that focus solely on pricing; we will also discuss models where
pricing choices are made jointly with other decisions like production or distribution
of resources.
1.1 Various Types of Pricing Models
For convenience, in this section, we group the pricing models according to different
categories for clarity and ease of presentation. In addition, in each category, the
4
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papers may be jointly discussed according to their characteristics or assumptions
made.
1.1.1 Static Non-competitive Pricing Models
These models involve the simultaneous pricing of multiple products offered by a
single seller, where a fixed price is set for each product. Note that some papers
may deal with different varieties of a single product offered, with corresponding
different prices set. In our work, we consider all these different varieties as ‘different’
products. In other words, the number of products correspond to the number of
price variables considered. We have found few particularly relevant papers in this
category, as many of the static (monopolistic) models in the literature deals with
only one product.
Weatherford [96] discussed joint pricing and allocation decisions for different price
classes (e.g., full-price and discount), offered commonly in transportation indus-
tries. Demands for the multiple classes were assumed to be normally distributed.
Upper bound constraints on the quantities allocated for the different class were
present. The decisions were made via the maximization of expected profits, sub-
ject to price ranking and other constraints (added to minimize the possibility of
negative demand). Different behaviors of customers and control mechanisms were
considered, and explicit expressions for the optimal expected profit could be ob-
tained at times.
In a similar setting, the airline pricing paper by Botimer and Belobaba [15]
considered the case when the diversion of passengers’ demand is allowed. The
















PjdijQi, where dij is the percentage of
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fare product i passengers diverting to lower-priced fare product j, and Qi is the
passenger demand for product i. It is the revenue expected from each fare product
(without diversion), less the decreased revenue due to the loss of passengers to
the lower-priced products, plus the revenue gained from the lower-priced products
from the diverting passengers.
Birge, Drogosz and Duenyas [13] studied the optimal pricing strategies of two
substitutable products A and B, given the capacity constraints, in a single-period
problem. Supposing that the mean demand for product A is ua(Pa, Pb), a function
of both prices Pa and Pb, the demand for product A, xa, is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over [ua(Pa, Pb) − r, ua(Pa, Pb) + r], where r is the range of realizable
demands above and below its mean. Given the fixed production capacity and per
unit variable cost of product A, i.e., Ca and wa respectively, the contribution of




xafa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa+(Pa−wa)Ca
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+r
Ca
fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa.
Here, fa(Pa, Pb, xa) is 1/2r. The notation used for product B’s parameters and the
expression for profit contribution of product B are analogously defined. The total
profit is then the sum of the products’ profits.
1.1.2 Dynamic Non-competitive Pricing models
Dynamic Pricing refers to the strategy where the pricing of products changes over
time. In multiple-period (or discrete-time) models, the prices change from period
to period, while remaining constant within each period. There has been much
research in this area, as such a strategy caters to changes in demand over time.
The reader can refer to Bitran and Caldentey [14], and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
[34] for overviews of the dynamic pricing literature. We will highlight some of the
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most relevant work here, especially those not covered in the review papers.
In finite horizon models, there is a finite amount of time in which a firm can sell
his products. In many cases, the firm has an initial stock of resources that can be
used in producing or offering the products or services, which may or may not be
replenished during the given time horizon. In addition, the salvage value of unused
resources is often zero.
The papers by Gallego and Van Ryzin [41] (an extension of their paper [40]), and
Maglaras and Meissner [61], make the above economic assumptions. They adopt a
similar modelling framework for their pricing models, and their aim is to maximize
the total expected revenues (inner product of price and demand vectors) of a firm
over a finite time horizon, given the fixed inventory of resources that can be used
for the multiple products or services, and a set of allowable prices.
In [41], given p(t) and λ(p(t)) as the price and demand (dependent on p(t))
vectors for all the products offered at time t; A as the resource matrix (the aij
entry is the amount of resource i needed to produce a unit of product j); and
x as the vector of the initial stock of resources, the deterministic version of the







Aλ(p(s)) ds ≤ x, p(s) ∈ P(s), s ∈ [0, t]
}
,
where P(s) is the set of allowable prices.
[61] discussed a discrete-time formulation of the above model, and the multi-
dimensional pricing strategies are implicitly obtained by solving dynamic opti-
mization problems, where they are left with only the one-dimensional aggregate
capacity consumption rate to be determined.
Another continuous-time finite horizon model was studied recently by Adida
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and Perakis in [1]. In their paper, a robust optimization approach was intro-
duced into a fluid model for the dynamic pricing and inventory control problem
of a make-to-stock manufacturing system. For each product i at time t, the
given inputs include the per-unit holding cost hi(t), the production cost func-
tion fi(·), the demand function di(t), the initial inventory level I0i , and the shared
production capacity rate K(t). The nominal problem is then to determine the
prices {pi(t)}, the production flow rates {ui(t)}, and the inventory levels {Ii(t)},









K(t), I˙i(t) = ui(t) − di(t), Ii(0) = I0i , ∀ i, and the standard nonnegativity con-
straints on the control variables and the demand function. The demand uncertainty
was incorporated into this model by a certain perturbation of the model, including
the replacement of di(t) by d˜i(t), with the parameters defining d˜i(t) constrained
by an uncertainty set. The authors go on to discuss some simplified models, and
some theoretical and numerical studies were done.
In infinite horizon models, the rewards received in the future are usually dis-
counted by given discount factors, and the aim is to maximize the total discounted
profit from time zero to infinity. Kopalle, Rao and Assunca˜o [52] discussed a
discrete-time infinite horizon model which takes into account the effects of refer-
ence prices on profits.
More specifically, for a retailer with brands {1, ..., N}, the total discounted profit






βt(pit − cit)[qit + gi(rit − pit)], where qit is one com-
ponent of the demand function, dependent on all products’ prices {pjt} at time t,
and the other component gi(rit− pit) depends on the deviation of product i′s price
from the reference price rit at time t. Here gi = δi > 0 (the gain factor) if rit ≥ pit,
else gi = γi > 0 (the loss factor), cit is the constant unit cost, and 0 < β
t < 1 is the
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discount factor at time t. See Keller and Rady [50], and Richards and Patterson
[78] for other infinite horizon retail pricing models.
The continuous-review and periodic-review models are also studied in the litera-
ture. The common characteristics of the latter model are: the planning horizon is
divided into discrete time periods; at the beginning of each time period, the price of
a product for the period is determined, the inventory is reviewed and replenishment
is made (if necessary), see [20] and [22].
As for the continuous-review model, the common modeling framework employed
is that, demand arrives randomly at discrete time, the decisions of pricing and
replenishment are made after serving the demand; the inter-arrival time has a
certain distribution, which, just like the demand size, depends on the selling price
set previously (see [18] and [21]). Backlogged demand are allowed in many of these
models (i.e., any unmet demand at a given time can be satisfied later), at certain
shortage costs.
1.1.3 Competitive Pricing Models
As the word ‘competitive’ suggests, the sellers make pricing and other decisions
based on one another’s choices. The demand function facing each seller is thus
commonly a function of other sellers’ choice variables as well.
One of the simplest, commonly considered competitive models is probably the
Bertrand oligopoly game, where each seller i maximizes his profit pii = (pi −
ci)Di(pi, p−i), with pi, ci and Di as the price, cost (a constant) and demand for
product i respectively, and p−i as the price vector of all other products. Note that
pi is the only decision variable for seller i and there may be restrictions on it, like
upper and lower bound constraints, as mentioned in Topkis [93], and Milgrom and
1.1 Various Types of Pricing Models 10
Roberts [62].
In Oxenstierna [65], Gallego and Georgantzis [42], Tanaka [91], and Mizuno [63], a
Bertrand game is also discussed, but with variations of the above model. The sellers
offer multiple products each, and a multiple-period pricing scheme is considered
in [42]. The focus in their paper is on experimental results, e.g., corresponding
to different demand parameters or number of products offered per seller. [63],
[65] and [91] allowed the cost ci to be a function dependent on demand Di(p)
(= Di(pi, p−i)), thus the total cost for seller i was ci(Di(p)) instead. Four different
types of equilibrium configurations were discussed in [91] and the corresponding
optimal strategies were compared.
Dai, Chao, Fang and Nuttle [26] took into account the limited capacity of firms
and discussed a two-firm model. The payoff function for each firm i (i = 1, 2) is
then of the form pii = (pi − wi)min{Ci, Di(p1, p2)}, where wi is the unit cost of
the product/service at firm i, and Ci is the capacity of firm i. They conducted
equilibrium and sensitivity analyses, where deterministic and stochastic demand
functions are considered separately.
The multi-period pricing model of Perakis and Sood [71] follows the finite horizon
setting described previously. It is similar to [26] in the sense that the amount of
product sold is limited by the product inventory and the demand observed. Thus,
if qti and p
t
i are the quantity sold and price of seller i
′s product respectively, the










qti ≤ Ci, qti ≤ Dti(pti, pt−i), ptmin ≤ pti ≤ ptmax, qti ≥ qmin, ∀ t
}
,




min are given bounds
on the price set, and T is the total number of periods considered. Note that the
demand in each time period only depends on the prices of all products within the
same time period.
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Then in [72], Perakis and Sood extended the above model by taking into account
the uncertainty of demand and protection levels for each period. Their paper
may be the first to consider a competitive dynamic pricing model using robust
optimization techniques. The demand uncertainty in each period facing seller i, is
represented by a vector of parameters, denoted the uncertainty factor ξti . Thus in












i), ∀ ξti ∈ U ti , a given closed
and convex uncertainty set. In addition, for each period t, there is a protection level
of Lti, indicating the level of inventory that seller i wants to protect or reserve for









i ≤ Ci − Lti, ∀ t.
Bernstein and Federgruen discussed retail pricing strategies recently in [7], [8],
[9] and [10]. In [7], they worked under centralized and decentralized supply chain
settings. In the centralized system, a single decision maker (the supplier) is as-
sumed to determine all retailer prices, sales volumes, and replenishment strategies,
while under the decentralized setting, the supplier decides on his wholesale pricing
scheme and replenishment policy based on the retailers’ orders (where each retailer
maximizes his own profit). The profit function considered depends on the replen-
ishment strategies and several costs factors, including fixed and variable delivery
costs between supplier and retailers, annual holding costs of inventories and annual
costs incurred for managing a retailer’s accounts.
Similar to the above, [10], [8] and [9] assumed a single supplier servicing a network
of retailers, but only in a decentralized supply chain system. In [10], at the start
of the period, each retailer chooses his retail price pi and order quantity yi from
the supplier, where he is charged a constant per-unit wholesale price wi. Note
that excess inventory can be bought back by the supplier at a given per-unit
rate bi. Thus the expected profit function for retailer i is of the form pii(p, y) =
(pi − wi)yi − (pi − bi)E[yi − Di(p)]+, where p is the vector of all retailers’ prices,
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Di(p) is the random demand at price p facing retailer i, and [x]
+ = max{x, 0}.
[8] and [9] extended the model in [10] to periodic review, infinite-horizon models,
where each retailer aims to maximize his expected long-run profit. The retailers
face a stream of demands that are independent across time, but not necessarily
across the retailers. At the end of each period, inventories are carried over to the
next at a cost of h+i per unit; while any inventory shortfalls are backlogged at a
cost of h−i per unit, for retailer i. Thus in [8], the single-stage profit function is of
the form pii(p, yi) = (pi − wi)di(p) − h+i E[yi −Di(p)]+ − h−i E[Di(p) − yi]+, where
di(p) is the expected demand (or sales) at price p, for retailer i.
Then in [9], they incorporated service competition into the model, where the
demand now depends on f as well, with fi denoting the service-level target, or fill
rate (fraction of demand that can be met from existing inventory), to be selected by
retailer i. The profit function for retailer i becomes pii(p, yi, f) = (pi−wi)di(p, f)−
h+i E[yi − Di(p, f)]+ − h−i E[Di(p, f) − yi]+, with some restrictions on the price
and fill rate to be set. Three competition scenarios are discussed here: price
competition only, simultaneous price and service-level competition, and two-stage
competition (where a service level is chosen first by all competitors, followed by
a simultaneous choice of the pricing and inventory strategies in response to the
service levels selected).
In contrast to the above, Besanko, Gupta and Jain [11] discussed the simul-
taneous pricing policies of oligopolistic manufacturers and one common retailer.
Each manufacturer m chooses the wholesale prices of his brands wi (i ∈ Im), in
response to the retail prices of his competitors’ brands pk and the retail margins
of its own brand, while the retailer responds to the wholesale prices set. Given
that there are H households, ci is the marginal cost of producing brand i and si
is the probability that any given household buys brand i (a given function of the
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retailer’s prices), manufacturerm wishes to maximize pim =
∑
i∈Im (wi−ci)siH. At
the same time, the retailer finds the optimal retail prices by solving the problem:
max piR =
∑
j∈I (pj − wj)sjH, where I is the set of all manufacturers’ brands.
Note that a similar profit function formulation was considered by [30].
A way of incorporating service competition into a pricing model, which differs
from that in [9], is to compete in terms of time guarantee, as done in So [88]. The
demand facing service provider i, λi, depends on the ‘attraction of firm i’, which
in turn depends on the price, pi, offered, and ti, the guaranteed time needed to
deliver the service. Each firm maximizes his profit (pi − ci)λi subject to ti ≥ 0,
an upper bound on pi, and a lower bound on the probability of meeting the time
guarantee. They also studied the impact on pricing strategies when the firms’
capacity restrictions are incorporated into the model. See [55] and [57] for other
models of pricing and delivery-time competition.
Federgruen and Meissner [37] may be the first to discuss a competitive pricing
model that combines the complexity of time-dependent demand and cost functions
with that arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. They assume that each firm i
adopts one price pi to be employed throughout the horizon. The demand d
i
t facing
firm i in period t (t = 1, ..., T ) can be written as βitδ
i(p), where {βit} are multiplica-
tive seasonality factors (characterizing the demand functions’ time dependence),
and δi(p) is firm i′s deseasonalized demand function. Given that Ki is firm i′s fixed
setup cost, and F in(t) is the minimum total variable procurement and holding costs
in periods 1, ..., t for firm i; assuming exactly n setups are performed in the first
t periods, the profit maximization model for firm i, given other firms’ prices p−i,









iδi(p)− nKi − δi(p)F in(T )
}
.
In Roy, Hanssens and Raju [81], a Stackelberg game is discussed, where the price
leader and the follower offers one brand each in the market. The objectives of the
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leader and follower are to set prices so as to minimize the deviations of sales in
each period from preset targets, with the leader anticipating and planning for a
certain level of the follower’s sales. The optimal price rule is proved to be of a
simple linear form.
Then in Li, Huang, Yu and Xu [58], another Stackelberg game was formulated
to model the competition between the manufacturer and the distributor. The
manufacturer acts as a leader and determines the prices of products sold through
traditional channels (i.e., the products sold to the distributor), and online channels
(i.e., products sold to customers directly in an electronic manner). The distributor
then acts as a follower and selects the optimal price to offer to customers, after
knowing the manufacturer’s decision.
Zhou, Lam and Heydecker [101] introduced a bilevel transit fare equilibrium
model for a deregulated transit system. They first modeled the interaction between
a single transit operator and passengers in the form of a Stackelberg game, in
which the operator anticipates the passengers’ response to changes in fares. Then
they extended this framework to the case involving several non-cooperative transit
operators, i.e., to model the fare competition between transit operators.
A different type of pricing competition exists in a homogeneous product mar-
ket, i.e., all the firms offer exactly the same product, and the consumers usu-
ally purchase the product from the firm offering it at the lowest price. In this
case, there are no firm-specific demand-price relationships. See Dastidar [27] and
Tasna´di [92] for Bertrand-type models of such competition. Bai, Tsai, Elhafsi and
Deng [4] discussed pricing and production scheduling under the assumption that
the capacity of firms, the demand process and its allocations are random. Then
in Sanner and Scho¨ler [82], spatial price discrimination in a two-firm competi-
tion is considered. Under this setting, each consumer’s demand is determined by
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p(r) = min{pi(r), pj(r)}, where pi(r) is the delivered price at distance r from firm
i′s location. See [80] and [70] for other spatial pricing models, where the prices
and demands depend again on the location of the consumers, but with product
differentiation incorporated into it.
1.2 Types of demand models
Demand models are fundamental tools in pricing models. Many different formula-
tions have been considered in the literature, whether it be solely price-dependent
or dependent on other attributes as well, either with deterministic or stochastic
parameters. We focus on the description of models that are most relevant to us,
namely, those involving multiple products.
1.2.1 Deterministic Models
In this subsection, we assume that the sellers have perfect knowledge of the demand
process, i.e., customer behaviour is known throughout the relevant time horizon
considered. The advantages of such models are that they are simple and can
provide a good approximation for the more realistic stochastic models.
The most commonly considered demand model is the linear demand function.




is the demand for product i at the price vector p of all products, aii > 0 reflects
the effect of its own price on its demand, and aij represents the dependence of its
demand on other products’ prices (if they exist). Note that the parameters aij > 0
(or aij < 0) imply that product j is substitutable for (or complement to) product
i. Such a demand function can also be derived from the quadratic utility function
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of a representative consumer. See [32], [80], [65], [82], [42], [83], [7], [43], [25] and
[52] for varied forms of this linear demand model.
In particular, some (e.g., [65]) discussed the linear dependence of demand on the
deviation between each product’s price pj and the average weighted price of all the
products offered
∑
i sipi (where si ≥ 0,
∑
i si = 1). Also, in the spatial models of
[80] and [82], the same linear demand function applies to all the products or firms,
but the prices offered to the consumers depend on the location of the consumers,
with respect to the firms.
Instead of a single linear demand function for each product, Boyer and Moreaux
[16], Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller [49], and Raz and Porteus [76] discussed piecewise linear
demand functions. [16] and [49] considered a function of the form max{bi− aiipi+∑
j 6=i
aijpj, 0}, while [76] assumed linear functions with different parameters over
different price ranges (i.e., each ‘piece’ corresponds to a different price range).
Another commonly discussed demand form is concave demand functions. [71]
assumed that the demand for product i at each time period t, dti, is a concave
function of all products’ prices pt in the same time period, and decreases in pti.
Similar assumptions were made in [87] and [72].
Besides linear or concave demand models, another type of frequently employed
demand functions are the functions which satisfy the (ID) or (LID) property.
A function f(x1, ..., xn) is said to have increasing differences (ID) in (xi, xj) if
f(x1, ..., x
′
i, ..., xn)− f(x1, ..., xi, ..., xN) is nondecreasing in xj for all xi < x′i. If the
function f is twice differentiable, this property is equivalent to ∂2f/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0.
When Log f satisfies the (ID) property, f is said to possess the (LID) property.
Among the models that employ functions with the above properties are those
discussed in [93] and [26]. Both assume that the demand for each product decreases
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in its own price and increases in other prices (substitutable products), and the
demand facing each firm satisfies the (ID) property.
Then in [62], the demand functions are assumed to satisfy the (LID) property.






−λpj , with λ > 0, Ci,




j , with ai > 0, βi > 1, βij ≥ 0






, with r < 0 and γ > 0; and linear demand
functions.
The use of the logit model was found in [11]. The expected demand for a
given brand j at time t, Djt, was based on the average consumer’s consumer
surpluses for the different brands at time t, through the logit function. More
precisely, Djt = sjtH, i.e., the product of sjt (the probability that any given house-




α(vit−pit)+1 , where I is the set of all brands and vjt − pjt represents the
consumer surplus for brand j at time t. Note that vjt =
β0j+βXjt+ψjt
α
, is the average
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for brand j at time t; where Xjt is a vector
of observable product attributes and marketing variables characterizing brand j;
β is a vector of the response coefficients for the observable product attributes; α is
the price response coefficient; ψjt is the mean utility that each consumer obtains
from unobservable product attributes, and β0j is a brand-specific intercept indi-
cating intrinsic preferences for brand j. See also [30] and [101] for similar usages
of the logit function.
A list of common assumptions made about demand functions in Bertrand games
was discussed in [91]. Given that there are n firms (n products), the demand for
product i, di(p) is assumed to be (i) continuous on R
n
+ and symmetric for all firms;
(ii) positive in Xi, a non-empty bounded region of R
n
+ (let X = ∩ni=1Xi); and (iii)
continuously twice differentiable in int(X) (the interior of X), with (∂di/∂pi) < 0
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and (∂di/∂pj) > 0.
As mentioned in [63], many discrete choice models satisfy the conditions on de-
mand as presented in their paper. For each brand i, they assume: (a) di(pi, p−i) > 0
and di is strictly decreasing in pi; (b) di(p) = di(p+ ke
n) for all k, where en is the








−i) ≥ di(pHi , pL−i)di(pLi , pH−i) for pHi ≥ pLi ,
pH−i ≥ pL−i; and possibly (d) di is increasing in p−i on Rn.
In some papers, the demand model considered may involve factors other than
prices. For example, the demand equation for each of the two brands offered, in
[81], depends linearly on the sales of both brands in the previous period (t−1) and
the prices of both brands at time t; and other exogenous factors represented by a
forecasted error term. Then in [88], the customers choose the service provided by
each firm i based on its price, pi, and the delivery time guaranteed, ti, through the


















attraction of firm i. Also, in [29], the demand for each product offered decreases
linearly in the product’s price and the time required to deliver the product.
1.2.2 Stochastic Models
Such models are more complicated as they take into account the uncertainty of
demand. Here, the demand function is often modeled based on a given probability
distribution. We will discuss the different formulations of stochastic demand used
in pricing models in this section.
As mentioned above, linear demand is often used in pricing models. When ran-
domness of demand is incorporated into some models, a common assumption made
is that the mean of demand is a linear function of prices.
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As an example, see [96], where demand follows a normal distribution, indepen-
dent for the different price classes considered, with the mean demand being a linear
function of the previous class’s price, its own price, and the price of the next lower-
ranked class. Other instances of linear expected demand functions can be found
in [50] and [13]. See also [13] and [68] for usage of normally distributed demands.
Reibstein and Gatignon [77] assumes that the sales (demand) and prices of prod-







time t, where βi,j (j 6= i) represents the cross-elasticity between product i and oth-
ers, and ui,t is the error term. Instead of considering a normal demand distribution,
they assumed that ui,t is normally distributed (for each i and t). Correlation among
the error terms of the different products were also allowed.
Many papers consider varied forms of these two models of uncertain demand: a
multiplicative model, dt(p) = βtδt(p), and an additive model, dt(p) = δt(p) + βt,
where δt(p) is the demand function and βt is the uncertainty parameter, at time
t. For example, assuming that each firm offers one product, [37] uses the demand
system: dit(p) = β
i
tδ
i(p). This is the demand facing firm i in period t, where {βit}
are multiplicative seasonality factors, and δi(p) is firm i′s deseasonalized demand
function, assumed to be continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing in pi.
The linear demand function was given as an example of δi(p). Then in [45], a con-
tinuous random variable θ is added to the standard form of linear demand function
to reflect the randomness of demand, where θ is assumed to have a continuously
differentiable probability distribution function.
The papers [8], [9] and [10] considered similar multiplicative demand formula-
tions. Let Dit(p) be the random demand faced by retailer i in period t, given that
p is the vector of prices set by all retailers. [8] considered the demand variables to
be of the multiplicative form, i.e., Dit(p) = di(p)²it, with di(p) = EDit(p) as the
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expected demand, and {²it} as a sequence of continuous i.i.d. random variables.
The expected demand functions are assumed to satisfy the monotonicity conditions
∂di(p)/∂pi ≤ 0 and ∂di(p)/∂pj ≥ 0 (for all i, j, j 6= i); and the (LID) property.
Examples of such functions are the Logit and CES functions as mentioned earlier.
Note that [10] dealt with a single-period version of this demand model.
Then in [9], the fill rate (or service level) f was incorporated into the multi-
plicative demand model as both price and service competition were considered.
They assumed the average sales function of the form di(p, f) = ψi(f)qi(p), where
ψi(f) is a function of the service levels of all firms, and qi(p) is a standard demand
function satisfying the (LID) property. In addition, di was assumed to satisfy the
dominant diagonal condition
∑N
j=1 ∂di/∂pj < 0 for retailer i, i = 1, ..., N , on top
of the monotonicity conditions listed above.
In [41] and [61], given a set of n products, the demand for the products at time
t is assumed to be a Poisson process with rate λ = (λ1, ..., λn), determined by
the menu of prices p(t) = (p1(t), ..., pn(t)) ∈ P (the set of feasible price vectors)
at time t, through a demand function λ(p(t)). Further, they assume that the
demand function satisfies certain regularity conditions: at each time t, there exists
an inverse demand function (i.e., p(t) can be expressed as a function of demand);
the revenue rate is continuous, bounded and concave; and for each product, there
exists a null price that leads to zero demand.
[26] studied the case where the demand of each firm i (i = 1, 2), Di(p1, p2), is
a continuous random variable with c.d.f F
(p1,p2)
i (x). Denoting F¯
(p1,p2)
i (x) = 1 −
F
(p1,p2)
i (x) = Pr{Di(p1, p2) > x} , they made three assumptions. That is, for





p′j ≥ pj; and F¯ (p1,p2)i (x) has increasing differences in (p1, p2). Note that the first two
assumptions are analogous to the common assumptions made in the deterministic
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case, i.e., demand decreases in its own price and increases in other products’ prices.
[47] considered semilog and doublelog demand functions, with error terms in-
corporated into them. A basic semilog demand function can be of the form
ln(di) = ai +
∑n
j=1 bijpj, where ai, bij are constant parameters, while a doublelog
function may look like ln(di) = ai +
∑n
j=1 bijln(pj).
Given that the market size is N , and pjt and αjt represent seller j
′s price and the
probability that a consumer prefers seller j in period t respectively, [85] considered
the demand for seller j′s product, given by Nαjt, to be of the linear, CES and
exponential form (e.g., b0
∏
i e
bitpit , with bjt < 0, b0, bit > 0, i 6= j).
1.3 Properties of Pricing Models
In many articles in the literature, we observe some common areas of focus. They
include the formulation of the models introduced or used, their associated theoret-
ical properties, and the empirical testing of the models. In what follows, we will
highlight some frequently considered properties associated with pricing models.
1.3.1 Existence of Solutions to Pricing Models
When we study a pricing model, we may be interested to know whether an optimal
pricing strategy exists for a seller, and if it does, whether it can possibly be unique.
In the ideal case, closed form expressions of the optimal strategies or profits may
be obtained, though it is usually a very difficult task.
In [13] and [20], the concavity of the profit function was proven, which implied the
existence of a solution to the seller’s unconstrained pricing problem. The continuity
of profit functions, concavity of demand functions, compactness and convexity of
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feasible strategy sets, are some of the conditions that may ensure the existence and
uniqueness of an optimal solution, as seen in the discussion for the best response
problem facing a seller, in [71] and [72]. In addition, a closed form expression was
found for the optimal profit obtained in some of the single-seller models studied in
[96] and [10].
1.3.2 Nash Equilibrium Pricing Policy for Multiple Players
Whenever a game setting is assumed, a natural question one may ask is this:
does a Nash Equilibrium (NE) exist for the game? Vives [94], and Cachon and
Netessine (see chapter 2 of [86]) summarized some common sufficient conditions for
a NE to exist. These conditions include the quasi-concavity of payoff functions and
convexity of constraint sets, or the supermodularity setting of a game. Uniqueness
of a NE is considerably much harder (if possible) to verify than its existence. In [86],
some possible methods to show a unique NE were explained, e.g., via contraction
and univalent mapping arguments.
By showing that the profit function for each seller is concave in his own products’
prices (possibly together with other conditions), some authors verified the existence
of a NE for the games they considered. The relevant papers include [65], [91], [7]
and [37]. The equilibrium policy was obtained via solving first-order conditions in
some of these papers.
Another commonly employed approach for proving NE existence is using fixed
point theorems, e.g., Kakutani’s fixed point Theorem or Brouwer fixed point theo-
rem. In [55], the latter theorem was used for the stated purpose and the equilibrium
could be obtained via solving Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. [71], [101] and [72]
showed the existence of a NE policy by first reformulating their pricing game into
a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) problem, and then using the rich results from
1.3 Properties of Pricing Models 23
QVI theory (based on such fixed point theorems).
Topkis [93] and Milgrom and Roberts [62] provided explanations of supermod-
ular(or log-supermodular) games, and specified the conditions sufficient for Nash
Equilibrium existence for such games. In some papers (see e.g., [7], [8], [9], [10] and
[26]), the proof of NE existence (and sometimes uniqueness) was done by showing
that the games in question were supermodular or log-supermodular (under specific
conditions), and then using known supermodularity results, e.g., as found in [93]
and [62]. Note that these results also make use of some fixed point theorems, in
particular, Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
1.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
As the parameters defining the demand functions or cost functions can change, or
adjustments can be made to the capacity or inventory of a seller, it is useful to
understand how the profits or pricing strategies change accordingly.
See [96] for example, where the improvements in profits obtained are studied for a
single-seller model, in response to perturbations in the elasticity or cross-elasticity
of demands, the capacity of the airplane or hotel, and so on. In addition, when a
game is considered (e.g. see [72]), the changes in optimal strategies/profits for a
seller can also be monitored, when the inventory of other sellers or the number of
sellers in a market changes.
Empirical tools are often used in sensitivity analysis. However, in some papers,
e.g., [13], [88], [8] and [26], theoretical analyses were done to understand how
sensitive equilibrium prices are, with respect to parameters like capacities or unit
costs.
1.4 Main Applications 24
1.3.4 Deterministic Approximations to Stochastic Prob-
lems
Though in general, stochastic formulations of a problem may be superior to its de-
terministic version, the policies based on the deterministic solution can be asymp-
totically optimal, as the amount of expected sales tends to infinity. Indeed, this
was discussed in [40], [41] and [61]. It was also shown that the optimal revenue
of the deterministic problem is an upper bound on that of the original stochastic
problem.
1.3.5 Comparison of Different Types of Competitions
Comparisons between different types of games based on similar models have been
explored in the literature. One common discussion is that between Bertrand and
Cournot games. The optimal price vectors (or profits) obtained under both types of
competitions are often compared (for the Cournot case, the ‘optimal’ price vector
is that corresponding to the equilibrium quantity vector). Refer to [7], [37], [48]
and [91] for some relevant results. Another comparison seen in some papers (e.g.
[13] and [28]) is that between Bertrand and Stackelberg games.
1.4 Main Applications
Many diverse applications of pricing theory has appeared in the past – to manage
supply chains, e.g. in retail pricing, and in revenue management etc. We focus
on the review of applications in some main areas, with specific discussions of the
types of industries where applicable. Note that we do not discuss the applications
where demands are not explicitly considered, e.g, as it often happens in the pricing
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of stocks or derivatives.
1.4.1 Supply Chain Management
Typically, pricing is often coordinated with other aspects of the supply chain like
production and distribution, in manufacturing, retail industries, and so on. Ex-
tensive reviews of Supply Chain Management can be found in the handbook [86],
edited by Simchi-Levi, Wu and Shen, and the paper [56] by Leng and Parlar. We
will highlight the different applications most relevant to us.
A supply chain usually consists of a two-echelon distribution system, where a
manufacturer or supplier distributes products to retailers, who in turn sell them
to the consumers. Corbett and Karmarkar [23], Belleflamme and Toulemonde [5],
and many others, including [7], [8], [10], [11], [100] and [75], discussed the pricing
and allocation strategies (some with replenishment allowed) between the supplier
and retailers, and between the retailer and customers.
Perhaps one of the most prevalent use of pricing models is found in retail in-
dustries. This includes the pricing of fashion goods, books, cars and cellphones.
Retailers usually offer a wide variety of products to consumers, and they often
face intense competition and volatile demands. Many pricing models have been
introduced in the literature, with applications to general retail industries, e.g., [52],
[83], [9], and [22].
Some papers discussed pricing models for some specific product types. [81] specif-
ically focused on pricing in the U.S. automobile market. As mentioned therein, in
such markets, one brand usually acts as a price leader. For example, Chrysler and
American Motors were led by General Motors for many years. See also [12] for a
more general automotive application. In [78], supermarket retail pricing schemes
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were studied, for both the buying and selling of fresh produce. [28] explained a
model of brand-level competition between two leading brands sold by Coca-Cola
Company (Coke and Sprite) and two leading brands sold by Pepsi Company (Pepsi
and Mountain Dew). [25] investigated the pricing strategies used in the electricity
supply industry, by two non-cooperative power suppliers in the market.
The classic newsvendor problem is focused on determining the order quantity of a
product (e.g., newspapers) at the beginning of a single period that maximizes a re-
tailers expected profit, in a stochastic demand setting. Any unmet demand incurs
shortage costs and any leftover quantity at the end of the period incurs hold-
ing/overstocking costs. Various extensions of this problem has been considered,
e.g., incorporation of pricing and demand parameters into the decision-making
process, consideration of multiple products or multiple periods. See [51] and [73]
for relevant reviews.
When customers are delay-sensitive (sensitive to a firm’s quoted lead times), and
the firm incurs congestion costs and lateness penalties, a pricing model that also
decides the lead-time setting for a firm is appropriate. Refer to [66] for such a
model. In that paper, it was mentioned that any manufacturing firm that fulfills
custom orders on a first come-first served basis would be suitably represented by
this model. One example is the mail order companies that sell personal computers.
A basic feature of Reference Pricing (RP) in pharmaceutical markets is: a buying
agent decides on a reimbursement price for a drug and then the user/patient pays
the difference if the chosen medicine is more expensive. RP is used as a tool to
reduce the prices of referenced products, either through decreasing the demand
for highly-priced products, or cutting drug prices. Price competition in the drug
market is usually promoted as a result and the firms price their products around
the reference price. Refer to [59] and the papers mentioned therein for a more
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detailed discussion in this area.
In [46], the pricing of information products on online servers was studied. Online
servers provide access to diverse databases where users can browse through and
download the information they need. The authors described pricing strategies of
the following forms: connect-time-based pricing, flat rate per successful search
pricing, and subscription pricing.
[48] models the pricing and quantity competition between suppliers with two-
part pricing. A firm decides on two types of prices, namely, the access fee and
unit prices; and also two types of quantity variables, i.e., the number of customers
and quantities of outputs. Their model can be applied to club goods such as golf
courses and tennis courts, local public services such as parks and roads, or network
services such as telecommunication and electricity.
[97] proposed a two-stage, game-theoretic model for the pricing of cellular net-
works. Basically, in the first stage, the cellular firms choose their access prices for
terminating calls to their subscribers simultaneously. Then in the second stage, a
price for fixed-mobile calls to each cellular network is obtained; and at the same
time, the firms sell subscriptions to consumers (e.g. monthly package charges) and
also provides the termination service for fixed-mobile calls to consumers.
In the area of jointMarketing and Production, i.e., the coordination of pricing and
production decisions between the marketing and production departments, pricing is
often considered as a more significant tool than product benefits or image appeals.
See Eliashberg and Steinberg [33] for a review of the earlier literature on such
problems, and [68] for a recent discussion. Also, [85] discussed the use of advance-
selling of products as a marketing technique.
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1.4.2 Revenue Management
Traditionally, prices were not explicitly considered in Revenue Management (RM).
It was only around the last decade or so that pricing policies were actively used
here. The book by Talluri and Van Ryzin [90] provides an excellent review of the
theory and practice of RM. Here we will only focus on the area of applications
most appropriate for our purpose.
A perishable product is one that has a finite lifetime, i.e., it becomes worthless if
it is unsold after a given deadline has passed, e.g. an air ticket for a scheduled flight.
Perishable Asset Revenue Management (PARM) models are useful for situations
where the inventory is usually replenished after a certain amount of time has passed,
and hence is considered fixed in the pricing decision process, e.g. in the airline,
hotel and hospitality industries.
In RM, sellers are mainly interested in finding the optimal prices that maximize
their revenue (usually over a stipulated time horizon), subject to certain fixed
capacity or inventory restrictions. The joint pricing and allocation problems in
RM typically involve either (i) the allocation of a given set of resources needed to
produce a set of products and the pricing of the products; or (ii) the pricing and
allocation of a fixed, predetermined inventory of products to consumers. Many
researchers have explored pricing models for broad applications in RM. See [41],
[71] and [72].
In Feng and Gallego [39], a PARM model was proposed with applications to
industries including airlines selling seats before planes depart, hotels renting rooms
before midnight, theaters selling seats before curtain time, and retailers selling
seasonal items with long procurement lead times. Other discussions of general
PARM models can be found in [19] and [38].
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Airline pricing is the first major application in the area of RM. Here, RM tech-
niques are employed to price the tickets and allocate the seats to customers. Fare
classes are usually ranked to segment price-sensitive customers. The volume of re-
search in airline pricing is extensive. See [96], [15] and [2] for some related studies.
Some closely related applications of pricing (to airlines) are the pricing of cruise
lines and the rental of hotel rooms. In [53], the authors investigated the optimal
number of market segments and the pricing strategies for passenger cabins on
cruise-liners. See [54] for a very recent approach to determining hotel rentals.
A transit network consists of a set of stations or nodes, joined by a set of transit
lines. Passengers board, alight or change vehicles at the stations. A line segment
is the portion of a transit line between two consecutive stations. Different transit
lines may run in parallel along some line segments for part of their itineraries with
some stations in common. [101] developed a pricing scheme for the fare structure
of the transit lines, for different transit operators in the market.
The pricing of network services constitutes another important application. In
[95], a pricing algorithm was proposed for the provision of multiple Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) classes over Internet Protocol networks, based on the cost of providing
different levels of services and on long-term average user resource demand of each
service class, subject to the bandwidth availability of the network. Related works
were discussed in the survey paper [17], where pricing is used as a tool to control
congestion, encourage the growth of the network, and allocate resources to users





Demand-price relationships (or demand functions) of multiple products are among
the core ingredients in many decision-making models. However, it is highly nontriv-
ial to construct a multi-product demand function on the entire set of nonnegative
prices, not to mention approximating the real market demands to a desirable ac-
curacy. Thus, many decision-makers use incomplete demand functions which are
defined only on a restricted domain, e.g. the set where all components of demand
functions are nonnegative. In this chapter, we explain the necessity of defining
demand functions on the entire set of nonnegative prices; and discuss the draw-
backs behind some common complete demand functions. Then we formulate a
type of demand function using a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP). We
will show that such demand functions possess certain desirable properties.
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2.1 Motivation behind this demand system
It is generally observed that the demand for a product is insensitive to price changes
when prices of products in the market are sufficiently high (the demand may, e.g.,
vanish or be close to zero at such high prices). Thus, we can divide the set of
admissible prices RN+ into two areas, a main area where products’ demands are
sensitive to prices, and the area of other prices to which demands are insensitive.
In Figure 2.1 below, we illustrate the general demand functions for a market of 2
mutually substitutable products (using the Logit function mentioned previously).
Here we depict the demand function for product i (i = 1, 2) as Di(p1, p2). (Note
that though each function Di should be defined for all (p1, p2) ≥ 0, the figure only
shows the portion (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 10]× [0, 10]. Note also that the origin (p1, p2, Di) =








































Figure 2.1: Graphs of demand functions D1(p1, p2) and D2(p1, p2).
From the graph, we can see the typical shape of demand functions. Observe the
graph of D1 for example. As p1 increases, D1 decreases until, when p1 is sufficiently
large (≥ 6), the demand D1 becomes close to zero or it completely vanishes. For
a fixed p1 (for example p1 = 2), as p2 increases, D1 increases until a certain point
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(about where p2 = 6) and then it stays almost constant after that. Thus we see
that demands are sensitive to prices within a certain region, and much less sensitive
to prices outside it. This can be observed from the quadrilaterals on the surface
of the demand function: the quadrilaterals are irregular for (p1, p2) in the region
[0, 6]× [0, 6] (we refer to it as the main area), and regular (being rectangles) outside
this region. Hence, a demand function must approximate demands accurately on
the main area and can be relatively simple outside the main area.
Most demand functions, for example, the commonly used linear demand func-
tions, are difficult to be defined on RN+ , the set of all nonnegative prices, because
they inevitably become negative when prices are high. To be more specific, let us
consider the linear demand system of the form d(p) = b − Ap, where d and p are
the demand and price vectors respectively, b is a constant vector and A is a matrix
of appropriate dimensions. By the law of demand, i.e., the demand di decreases
in its own price pi, the demand function di will be negative for a large value of pi.
Thus, the linear demand function d is meaningful (nonnegative) only on Ω, defined
as the set of nonnegative prices at which all components of d(p) are nonnegative.
As it requires a proper reconfiguration to define demand reasonably outside Ω so
as to define a complete function on RN+ , the resulting pricing models will become
much more involved.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing multi-product pricing models using
linear demand functions restrict prices (as variables) on Ω, explicitly or implicitly,
except for Boyer and Moreaux [16], Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller [49]. However, as we will
explain in section 2.2, these latter models have certain undesirable properties.
Thus, it is of great interest to investigate the following question: are all p /∈ Ω
really redundant? We wish to argue that an extension of the domain of the demand
function is necessary in the sense that, in some applications, failing to do so will
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lead to erroneous conclusions.
Indeed, here we provide a simple pricing example where the maximum revenue
of a seller can be obtained at prices outside Ω.
Example 2.1. Consider a simple pricing problem involving a single seller offering 2
mutually substitutable products (e.g., business class and economy class air tickets).
The demand-price relationships are given by d1(p) = 20 − 3p1 + 2p2 and d2(p) =
100 + p1 − 4p2. For simplicity, we ignore the costs of production. Let qi represent
the quantity of product i to be sold, where i = 1, 2. As it is clear that the quantity
sold should be nonnegative and restricted by the amount demanded, we have the
constraints 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(p), for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the inventory level is 30, i.e.,
the total amount sold is restricted to be not more than 30. This translates to the
constraint q1+q2 ≤ 30. Due to differences in quality or attributes of the 2 products,
the price of product 1 is restricted to be not less than that of product 2. This gives
rise to the last constraint p1 ≥ p2 ≥ 0. The problem is then to decide on the prices
to set (and the amount to sell) to maximize the seller’s revenue q1p1 + q2p2, given
the demand, inventory and pricing constraints above.
Suppose we do not allow the consideration of prices p /∈ Ω. Then the constraints
p1 ≥ p2 and d1(p) ≥ 0 imply that
p1 ≤ 3p1 − 2p2 ≤ 20.
Thus, the maximum revenue that can be obtained is bounded from above by
q1p1 + q2p2 ≤ q1p1 + q2p1 ≤ 30p1 ≤ 30× 20 = 600.
However, if we consider the possibility of setting prices outside Ω, we can show that
a higher revenue can be obtained. Now we denote by D(p), the demand function
on RN+ such that D(p) = d(p) for p ∈ Ω, and D(p) satisfies the following reasonable
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conditions outside Ω: (i) Di(p) = 0 if di(p) < 0, and (ii) Di(pi, pj) is nondecreasing
in other product’s price pj (this assumes that products are substitutable).
If we set p2 = 23, then at any p1 ≥ 22, d1(p) ≤ 0. For example, if we set the
price to be p¯ = (24, 23), then we should have by (i), D1(p¯) = 0 and by (ii), noting
that (22, 23) ∈ Ω, D2(p¯) ≥ D2(22, 23) = d2(22, 23) = 100 + 22 − 4 × 23 = 30.
Choosing to sell 30 units of product 2 and none of product 1, i.e., q1 = 0, q2 = 30,
it is easy to see that all constraints are met (with d(p) replaced by D(p)) and the
total revenue obtained is
q1p1 + q2p2 = 0 + 30× 23 = 690 > 600.
This example shows clearly that at times, we do need to consider prices outside Ω
to achieve higher profits.
The restriction of admissible price variables entails the loss of some percentage
of profits (as shown above), for deterministic demands. However, for random
demands, this restriction may make it entirely impossible to define a reasonable
demand function, as shown below.
Example 2.2. For simplicity, let us consider a single-product linear demand func-
tion d(p) = 10 − ap, where a is a random variable with a certain distribution
on [0,∞). It is clear that for any p > 0, there exists an a ∈ [0,∞) such that
d(p) = 10 − ap < 0. Thus, the restriction of d on any fixed finite interval, e.g.
d : [0, δ]→ R1 with δ > 0, cannot define a nonnegative demand function.
A reasonable definition of the demand function is given by the two-piece function
D(p) =
 10− ap, p ≤ 10/a;0, p > 10/a. ∀ a ∈ [0,∞),
for all p ∈ R1+.
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In Section 3.2, we will present another example which involves a two-seller pricing
game. That example shows: an equilibrium price obtained from a game where
sellers are only allowed to set prices in Ω need not be an equilibrium price if prices
outside Ω are allowed.
Since prices outside Ω are necessary, the problem one faces now is how to define
the demand D on the whole set of nonnegative prices, in a simple and compelling
way. One common approach is to use elementary (closed form) functions to ap-
proximate demands. In particular, we can use a single elementary function to
approximate demands for prices on the entire RN+ . Some commonly used functions



















, with r < 0 and γ > 0, as mentioned in Milgrom and Roberts [62]
and Bernstein and Federgruen [8].
Though they seem simple, they may not reflect real market behavior. As men-
tioned above, demand usually differs in its sensitivity to prices over different areas.
Thus it is a very difficult task to approximate demand over all areas well with a
single-piece function. An accurate approximation in one area may result in poor
approximations in other areas. For example, the Cobb-Douglas and CES demand
functions Di blow up at very low prices pi, and the Cobb-Douglas function Di
tends to infinity as any other price pj tends to infinity. Besides, in pricing models
incorporating such functions, the existence of optimal solutions or Nash Equilib-
rium (NE) prices in games usually cannot be proved directly using standard re-
sults or fixed point theorems, as the functions are usually not concave (see Figure
2.1). By a Nash Equilibrium p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
M), we mean that for each seller
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, given other sellers’ prices p∗−i, p∗i maximizes his profits (see Nash
[64]). Indeed, as far as we know, NE existence is usually shown if each seller only
offers a single product.
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For example, as discussed in [62], suppose we have a Bertrand pricing game
involving any of the above common demand functions, i.e, the profit function facing
seller i is (pi− ci)Di(p), where the cost ci is constant; and only interval constraints
on the individual products are allowed, i.e., pi ∈ [0, p¯] for some constant p¯, for each
product i. NE existence is then proven by showing that the game in concern is
log-supermodular. Essentially, it is the same as proving that ∂2log(Di)/∂pi∂pj ≥ 0
for all products i, j, i 6= j. However, when each seller participating in a game offers
multiple products, or the constraint sets involved are some common convex sets,
which are not complete lattices or sublattices of RN , the game is unlikely to be of
a supermodular form. That is, it is difficult to guarantee NE existence for such
pricing games.
Another approach is this: because demands are generally highly sensitive to
prices in one main area and considerably less sensitive to prices in other areas, a
practically effective way to construct a demand function is first to approximate
demands on a main area Ω ⊂ RN+ by a function, say d, and then to extend it to the
whole RN+ . That is, we can construct a piecewise smooth demand function D that
allows us to approximate the demand on each area of prices using a piece of the
function. In contrast to single-piece functions, such multiple-piece functions can
approximate demands on the whole RN+ accurately. In particular, it allows one to
choose the most suitable function d on the main area Ω which reflects real market
behavior and possesses desirable properties, e.g. concavity or linearity, so as to
ease the computation and analysis.
If there is only one product, the obvious procedure is to define D(p) = d(p) if p ∈
Ω and D(p) = 0 if p /∈ Ω (i.e., if d(p) < 0), because the product’s demand depends
only on its own price. But for the case of multiple products, it is much more difficult
as the demands at all prices outside Ω need not vanish. Such a phenomenon
can be observed from Figure 2.1. For instance, in the region [6, 10] × [0, 6], D1
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is approximately zero, but D2 6= 0. Thus, it is not easy to build a multiple-
structured demand system, because it involves the determination of a large number
(exponential in the dimension) of areas and functions.
In our work, however, we provide a tractable way to approximate the demand in
the different areas via a simple Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP). Even
though the piecewise smooth demand function D is not concave on RN+ and thus
the best response problem in the pricing model is not convex, the NCP structure
permits, under certain conditions, the set of optimal solutions of the best response
problem to be convex. (We will discuss this in the last chapter). This property is
very important for the existence and computation of equilibrium prices. Further-
more, as will be demonstrated later through Theorems 3.6 and 3.9, many NCP
constrained best response problems can be reduced to essentially equivalent but
tremendously simplified problems. Indeed, in the reduced model, we only need to
consider a ‘ single-piece’ function in Ω (usually a convex and compact set). Hence
it is much simpler than a single-piece function defined on all nonnegative prices
(like those described above). In this way, we establish both the accuracy and the
simplicity of such pricing models. Not only do they become more computationally
tractable, they also have great theoretical advantages as we basically require de-
mand to be concave only on the restricted set of prices Ω, to ensure NE existence.
Thus in such cases, our model is in some ways superior to the other models.
Having understood the necessity of a complete reasonable definition of the de-
mand system on RN+ , we are now faced with the task of defining the demand
function explicitly.
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2.2 How to define Demand
Suppose that in a market there are M sellers and seller i offers Ni products, for
each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. In our work, for simplicity, we assume that all the products
offered are distinct. Indeed, in reality, the products offered by different sellers are
rarely identical. Thus, there are altogether N1 + · · · +NM = N distinct products
in the market. We denote the price of product j as pj and the price vector of all
other products as p−j, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let p = (p1; . . . ; pN) = (pj, p−j).
Let Dj denote the demand for product j and D = (D1; . . . ;DN). Here and below,
(x; y; z . . . ) symbolizes a vector in which x stacks on y, y stacks on z and so on.
(For typographical reasons, we shall often represent vectors by rows; however, the
reader should interpret ‘vector’ to mean ‘column vector’.) Because the products are
substitutable for each other or complementary to each other, demand Dj depends
on the prices of all products, thus it is a function of p.
Let d : RN+ → RN be a given function, where RN+ = {p ∈ RN | p ≥ 0}.
Essentially, we can call d a demand function in the sense that it characterizes (to
a desirable accuracy) the sensitive part of the real demand (on the main area as
we described in the introduction). However, d can be prescribed freely outside the
main area, and thus can be assumed to be smooth everywhere. In short, d can be
assumed to be simple and smooth. In practice, it is usually an elementary function,
or at least a function in closed form. In particular, if d is linear, then we write







 and A =





aN1 . . . aNN
 .
The diagonal entry ajj of A is the decrement in demand for product j when the
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price pj increases by one unit, and the (j, k) entry ajk of A is the amount of increase
in demand for product j when the price pk increases by one unit.
1
It is reasonable to assume that d(0) ≥ 0 and dj(pj, p−j) < dj(p′j, p−j) if pj > p′j,
given p−j fixed. That is, when all the prices are zero, the demand for each product
should be nonnegative and when the price of product j increases, the demand dj
should decrease. In the case of linear d, this translates to bj ≥ 0 and ajj > 0
for all j = 1, . . . , N . But note that products can be substitutable for each other
or complementary to each other unless it is specifically indicated, thus e.g., the
non-diagonal entries ajk are not restricted.
Allowing for accuracy on the main area and simplicity and smoothness on RN+ ,
d usually need not be nonnegative on RN+ . We introduce a function D : R
N
+ → RN+
which coincides with d on Ω, i.e. D(p) = d(p) for all p ∈ Ω, where
Ω = {p ∈ RN+ | d(p) ≥ 0}.
The definition of the nonnegative function D outside Ω requires much greater
caution.
For the single-product case, the demand function of the form
D(p) =
 d(p), p ∈ Ω;0, p ∈ R1+ \ Ω.
is most natural and commonly used. We attempt to extend it to the multiple-
product case.
Unlike the single-product case, for the multiple-product case, the function di can
be negative or positive at a p 6∈ Ω. It is natural to define Di(p) = 0 if di(p) < 0.
1Implicitly, we assume that the demand for any product in the market only depends on the
prices of products sold by the companies in this market, and does not depend on the price of any
product sold by the companies outside this market. All other factors that may influence demand
are assumed constant and represented by the constant term b or d(0).
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The difficulty lies in the setting of value of Di(p) if di(p) > 0 at p 6∈ Ω. The
following are possible and apparently natural ways to model demand outside Ω.
A possible model can be
D(p) =
 d(p), p ∈ Ω;0, p ∈ RN+ \ Ω.
However, for p¯ ∈ ∂Ω (the boundary of Ω), we have di(p¯) = 0 for some component
i, but we may also have dj(p¯) > 0 for another component j. Since Dj(p) = 0 for
all p 6∈ Ω, D so defined cannot be continuous, which is clearly undesirable.
To avoid the discontinuity, we can consider another model (as used in Boyer and
Moreaux [16], Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller [49]). For each j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Dj(p) =
 dj(p), dj(p) ≥ 0;0, dj(p) < 0.
A consequence of this model is: if dj(p¯) = 0, then for any p with pj > p¯j (with
other prices unchanged), Dj(p) = 0 since dj(p) < 0, but for each product i (i 6= j)
that is substitutable for product j, Di(p) (= di(p) > 0) may increase and tend to
infinity as pj → ∞. That is, the demand for product i may increase to infinity
when its own price pi is unchanged and some other price pj tends to infinity. This
is very unlikely to be valid in the market.
So, what should a rational demand function satisfy?
Consider a market of two substitutable products with demands D1 and D2 and
prices p1 and p2. Fix p1 = p¯1 and increase p2. At the beginning, assuming that both
D1 and D2 are positive, i.e. p = (p1, p2) ∈ int(Ω) (the interior of Ω), the demand
D2 decreases as p2 increases because some customers stop purchasing product 2.
These customers may decide to buy product 1 instead, thus D1 may increase. After
p2 is increased to a certain value p¯2, the demand D2 will drop to zero (assuming
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Ω is bounded). At this price, no customer purchases product 2 any more. Any
further increase of p2 should not affect the market because D2 will remain at zero
and D1 will not increase any more, as no customer demand can shift from product
2 to product 1. Based on this observation, a proper demand function D should
satisfy D(p¯1, p2) = D(p¯1, p¯2) for any p2 > p¯2. This property is formally stated
below.
Definition 2.3. A demand functionD that maps RN+ into R
N
+ is said to be regular
if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Di(p¯) = 0 and ∆ ≥ 0, then D(p¯ +∆ei) = D(p¯) where ei
is the i-th unit vector.
In the above illustration, we see that p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) is on Ω (more precisely, on
the boundary of Ω). For any p = (p¯1, p2) outside Ω with p2 > p¯2, we see that
D(p) = D(p¯) = d(p¯). This observation suggests that we can first define a map
B(p) = p¯ and then define D(p) = d(B(p)). We call B(p) the projected price of p2.
Such a map B can be defined via a complementarity problem as follows.
Definition 2.4. For any p ∈ RN+ , B(p) is defined as the solution of the NCP(p):
find x (= B(p)) such that
0 ≤ d(x) ⊥ p− x ≥ 0, (2.1)
where ⊥ stands for perpendicular and d(x) ⊥ p− x⇐⇒ d(x)T (p− x) = 0.
Definition 2.4 is essentially equivalent to Problem 1 in Shubik and Levitan ([84],
Appendix B). We formulate it explicitly as an NCP (Nonlinear Complementarity
Problem), so that the rich results available in the well-established area of NCPs
can be utilized and applications of this demand function can be more easily inves-
tigated.
2For any p ∈ RN+ , the projected price B(p) can be shown later to be nonnegative.
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Throughout this thesis, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all p ∈ RN+ , the NCP(p) has a unique solution B(p) and
B(p) ∈ Ω.
There has been extensive research on the existence and uniqueness of solutions
to complementarity problems, cf. Cottle, Pang and Stone [24] or Facchinei and
Pang [36]. In these references, the complementarity problem considered is of the
form: Given a mapping F : Rn+ → Rn, find x ∈ Rn such that 0 ≤ F (x) ⊥ x ≥ 0.
To use the results in these references for our purpose, we need to reformulate (2.1)
as: 0 ≤ F (x′) ⊥ x′ ≥ 0, where x′ = p− x and F (x′) = d(p− x′), given a p ∈ RN+ .
Then once x′ is obtained, x = p− x′ is found.
Now if d is linear, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique
solution to the LCP (Linear Complementarity Problem) is that A is a P-matrix,
i.e., all the principal minors of A are positive3 (see Theorem 3.3.7 on page 148 of
[24]). Thus in our work, we assume that A is a P-matrix.
For nonlinear d, if d is a P-function4, then the NCP(p) has at most one solution,
and if d is a uniformly P-function5, then the NCP(p) has a unique solution for
any p ∈ RN+ . See Proposition 3.5.10 on pages 303 and 304 of [36]. Note that
3For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the k × k principal minor of a matrix A ∈ Rn×n is the determinant
of the k × k matrix obtained from A after deleting the last n− k rows and n− k columns.





(xi − yi)(Fi(x)− Fi(y)) > 0.
5F is a uniformly P-function on RN+ if there exists a constant µ > 0 such that for all pairs of
vectors x, y in RN+ ,
max
1≤i≤N
(xi − yi)(Fi(x)− Fi(y)) ≥ µ‖x− y‖22.
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this proposition corresponds to a variational inequality problem VI(K,F), which is
equivalent to our reformulated NCP above, with K = RN+ and F as defined in the
reformulated problem. However, the conditions that can ensure B(p) ∈ Ω is less
obvious. We will illustrate this property for the linear function d in Lemma 2.8.
Under Assumption 1, we can define a demand function.
Definition 2.5. The demand function D : RN+ → RN+ is defined by
D(p) = d(B(p)), ∀p ∈ RN+ ,
where the map B is as stated in Definition 2.4.
The nonnegativity of D follows directly from the facts that B(p) ∈ Ω (as as-
sumed) and d is nonnegative on Ω. Also, with the continuity of d and B6, the
continuity of D is obvious.
In addition, this demand function is a unique extension of the function d, as
shown below.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumption 1, the function D as defined in Definition 2.5
is the unique regular demand function which agrees with d on Ω.
This theorem is a slight modification of Theorem 1 in Shubik and Levitan ([84],
Appendix B). Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 on page 217 of the book is applicable
here.
Now let us discuss the conditions which can guarantee that the assumption
B(p) ∈ Ω for any p ∈ RN+ holds true. For the linear function d, we can present
a necessary and sufficient condition. For nonlinear d, the conditions required are
more intricate. Thus, we will illustrate this only for linear d. First we need the
following result which shows when Ω is bounded.
6For example, the map B is continuous if the conditions in Corollary 5.1.5 of [36] are satisfied.
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Lemma 2.7. If d is linear and A is a P-matrix, then Ω is bounded.
Proof. If Ω is not bounded, then there exists a point p¯ ∈ Ω and a direction u ≥ 0,
such that
d(p¯+ λu) = b− A(p¯+ λu) ≥ 0, ∀λ ≥ 0.
that is,
d(p¯)− λAu ≥ 0, ∀λ ≥ 0.
Let
J = {j | uj > 0}.
Note that J 6= ∅. Consider the rows dj with j ∈ J ,
dJ(p¯)− λAJJuJ ≥ 0, ∀λ ≥ 0.
This implies
AJJuJ ≤ 0.
Since uJ > 0, we have
uj(AJJuJ)j ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ J.
Because AJJ is a P-matrix, by Theorem 3.3.4 (b) in [24], this implies uJ = 0, which
is a contradiction since by definition uJ > 0.
For any index set K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we always denote by K¯ the complement of
K, i.e. K¯ = {1, 2, . . . , N} \K.
Lemma 2.8. Let d be linear and A be a P-matrix. Then, B(p) ∈ Ω for all p ∈ RN+
if and only if
A−1JJbJ ≥ 0, ∀J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (2.2)
More precisely, under the above condition, B(p) = p if p ∈ Ω and B(p) ∈ ∂Ω if
p ∈ RN+ \ Ω.
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Proof. “⇐” Suppose condition (2.2) holds. We want to show that x = B(p) ∈ Ω.
Since LCP(p) implies b − Ax ≥ 0, we need only to show x ≥ 0. Let K = {k |
dk(x) = 0} and K¯ = {k | dk(x) > 0}. Then by the complementarity conditions of
LCP(p), we have pK¯ − xK¯ = 0. Since p ≥ 0, we have
xK¯ ≥ 0.
To show xK ≥ 0, we consider the polyhedron
H = {z | dK(z) = 0, dK¯(z) ≥ 0, zK¯ ≥ 0}.
Obviously, x ∈ H. Any vertex y of H is associated with an index set J such that
J ⊇ K and
dJ(y) = 0, yJ¯ = 0.
This implies yJ = A
−1
JJbJ ≥ 0 and shows that every vertex y of H is nonnegative.
Since x = B(p) can be represented as a convex combination of the vertices of H,
B(p) ≥ 0.
“⇒” For any K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we choose a p ∈ RN+ with pK¯ = 0 and pK ≥ 0
sufficiently large such that pK > xK for all x ∈ Ω. Such a pK exists because Ω is
bounded by Lemma 2.7.
Let p¯ = B(p). By assumption, B(p) ∈ Ω. Thus, p¯ ≥ 0.
Since p ≥ p¯ ≥ 0 and pK¯ = 0, we have p¯K¯ = 0.
It follows from pK > p¯K and (pK − p¯K)TdK(p¯) = 0 that dK(p¯) = 0. This yields
p¯K = A
−1
KKbK . Thus p¯K ≥ 0 implies A−1KKbK ≥ 0.
Remark: If d is linear and we are considering a system ofN mutually substitutable
products, then all the off-diagonal entries of A will be non-positive. If in addition,
A is a P matrix, then A is a nonsingular M-matrix. Thus the inverses of A and all
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its principal submatrices are nonnegative (see pages 132, 134 and 137 of Berman
and Plemmons [6]). It follows that with b ≥ 0, A−1JJbJ ≥ 0 will always be satisfied
for all J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}. This special case was considered in the appendix B of
[84].
The map B has a simple geometric structure. To show this, we introduce some
notations:
J(p¯) = {j | dj(p¯) = 0} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}
and the cone
C(p¯) = {p | pj ≥ p¯j ∀j ∈ J(p¯); pi = p¯i ∀i 6∈ J(p¯)}. (2.3)
Notice that C(p¯) = {p¯} for p¯ in the interior of Ω because J(p¯) = ∅.
Lemma 2.9. Under Assumption 1,
(i) p ∈ C(B(p)) for any p ∈ RN+ (i.e., B−1(p¯) ⊆ C(p¯)) ;
(ii) If p¯ ∈ Ω and p ∈ C(p¯), then p¯ = B(p) (i.e., C(p¯) ⊆ B−1(p¯)).
Proof. (i) Denote J(p) = {j | dj(p) = 0}. Let J = J(B(p)) and J¯ = {1, 2, . . . , N}\
J . For any p ∈ RN+ , under Assumption 1, B(p) ∈ Ω (see Lemma 2.8 for linear d).
By the definition of B, p ≥ B(p) and pJ¯ = B(p)J¯ . This shows that p ∈ C(B(p)).
(ii) For any p¯ ∈ Ω and p ∈ C(p¯), we have p ≥ p¯ and d(p¯) ≥ 0. Let J = J(p¯) and
J¯ = {1, 2, . . . , N} \ J . Then by definition of C(p¯), pJ¯ = p¯J¯ and dJ(p¯) = 0. This
yields (p − p¯)Td(p¯) = 0. Thus, p¯ is a solution of NCP(p). Under Assumption 1,
the solution of NCP(p) is unique, which is B(p). Thus, p¯ = B(p).
Lemma 2.9 shows that for any p ∈ RN+ , there exists a unique p¯ ∈ Ω such that
p ∈ C(p¯). In fact, p¯ = B(p). Combining (i) and (ii), we have C(p¯) = B−1(p¯). This
means that the map B(p) can be equivalently defined by the cone C(p).
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We now have both algebraic characterization (by NCP) and geometric charac-
terization (by the cones C(p)) of the map B.
Could other choices of the map B have been suitable to define the demand
function? We investigated the following possibility: the familiar orthogonal map.
However, we found that this map cannot be used.
Example 2.10. Suppose N(p) is the orthogonal projection of p on Ω. Let us
consider a single seller offering 2 products that are mutually substitutable (M = 1
and N = N1 = 2). Let p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ ∂Ω with d1(p¯) = 0 and d2(p¯) > 0 (where
d1, d2 are linear). Consider p
′ = (p1, p¯2) with p1 > p¯1. The orthogonal projection,
N(p′), of p′ on d1(p) = 0 satisfies N(p′) > p¯, and hence d2(N(p′)) < d2(p¯). See
Figure 2.2. If we define D(p) = d(N(p)), then D2(p1, p¯2) < D2(p¯1, p¯2) for p1 > p¯1.
This means that with p2 kept constant, an increase in p1 leads to a decrease in
demand for product 2. However, one would expect either an increase or no change
in the demand for product 2; resulting from either a shift in demand from product
1 to product 2, or a decision to give up on buying. That is, it is not reasonable
to have Dj decreasing in pk, for k 6= j, if we are considering a market of mutually
substitutable products. Therefore, the orthogonal map is not suitable for defining
the demand function.
Having clearly explained the demand model, we will now study some desirable
and useful properties of the demand function.
2.3 Some Properties of the Demand Function
The demand function defined in the preceding section possesses some properties
which are desirable from the perspective of Economics and Management. In our
work, we will only investigate a fundamental property: monotonicity (it is called







































Figure 2.2: Illustration of orthogonal projection N and mapping B.
the law of demand in Economics). It is a desirable property in many applications
of demand functions.
We will first investigate the change of demand of a product as its own price
varies, then followed by the change of demand of all the products as all prices vary.
Although the former is a special case of the latter, the former may be observed
under weaker conditions. Note that most of the results in this section are proven
for the linear d case for simplicity.
Theorem 2.11. Let d be linear. If A is a P-matrix and the condition (2.2) is sat-
isfied, then the demand function D : RN+ → RN+ defined in Definition 2.5 satisfies:
Dj is non-increasing in pj.
Proof. Suppose that the price vector of all the products excluding product j, p−j,
is fixed. So we can consider Dj and B as functions of pj, and write Dj(pj) and
B(pj) instead. We first consider the interval
Ωj := {pj | Dj(pj) > 0}.
For every pj ∈ Ωj, we denote K := {k | dk(B(pj)) = 0} and K˜ = {1, ..., N} \ (K ∪
{j}). Then since bK−AKjBj(pj)−AKKBK(pj)−AKK˜BK˜(pj) = 0 and Bj(pj) = pj
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and BK˜(pj) = pK˜ by complementarity, we have
BK(pj) = A
−1
KK(bK − AKjpj − AKK˜pK˜).
Thus,
Dj(pj) = bj − Ajjpj − AjK˜pK˜ − AjKA−1KK(bK − AKjpj − AKK˜pK˜)
= (bj − AjK˜ pK˜ − AjKA−1KK bK + AjK A−1KK AKK˜pK˜)− (Ajj − AjK A−1KKAKj) pj.
Since Dj is continuous, Dj is non-increasing on Ωj if and only if the term Ajj −
AjK A
−1
KKAKj is nonnegative at every pj ∈ Ωj. Let α = {j,K}. Then Aαα = Ajj AjK
AKj AKK
 . Now we have
detAαα = det
Ajj − AjK A−1KKAKj 0
AKj AKK
 = (Ajj − AjK A−1KKAKj) detAKK .
Since A is a P-matrix, both detAαα and detAKK are positive. Thus,
Ajj − AjK A−1KKAKj > 0.
After Dj(pj) decreases to 0, as pj increases further, Dj(pj) remains at 0. Thus
Dj is non-increasing in pj.
The above result is a very basic property that D should satisfy. However, we
should also consider the case in which the prices of more than one product vary.
A non-rigorous statement of the monotonicity of demand is that total demand for
all the products should not increase for any increase in prices.
The difficulty of extending this monotonicity to multiple-product markets lies in
that the space of RN is not totally ordered, i.e., not every pair of points can be
ordered. For instance, we cannot tell which of (0, 1) and (1, 0) is larger.
2.3 Some Properties of the Demand Function 50
We can express the monotonicity for a single product in two different ways:
(i) D(p′) ≤ D(p), ∀ p′ ≥ p ≥ 0;
(ii) (p′ − p)(D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ 0, ∀p′, p ∈ R+.
To extend (i) to the multiple-product market, we consider the total demand
ηTD(p) (with weight η ∈ RN+ ) , i.e.,
ηTD(p′) ≤ ηTD(p), ∀p′ ≥ p ≥ 0.
The extension of (ii) to the multiple-product market is given by
(p′ − p)T (D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ 0, ∀p′, p ∈ RN+ .
We will show that the demand model D satisfies these properties.
We first need the technical lemma below.
Lemma 2.12. For any index set J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, if d is linear, the set
SJ = {p ∈ RN+ | dJ(B(p)) = 0, pJ¯ = B(p)J¯}
is convex, and the restriction of the map B on SJ satisfies
B(λp1 + (1− λ)p2) = λB(p1) + (1− λ)B(p2), ∀p1, p2 ∈ SJ , λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.4)
Proof. Let p1, p2 ∈ SJ . Denote
p(λ) = λp1 + (1− λ)p2,
and let
x(λ) = λB(p1) + (1− λ)B(p2).
It follows from d(B(pi)) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, that
d(x(λ)) ≥ 0, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.5)
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It follows from pi ≥ B(pi), i = 1, 2, that
p(λ) ≥ x(λ), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.6)
Furthermore, since pi ∈ SJ , i = 1, 2, one can verify that
dJ(x(λ)) = λdJ(B(p
1)) + (1− λ)dJ(B(p2)) = 0, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.7)
and
p(λ)J¯ = x(λ)J¯ , ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.8)
It follows from (2.7) and (2.8) that
d(x(λ)) ⊥ (p(λ)− x(λ)). (2.9)
Now, (2.5), (2.6) and (2.9) show that x(λ) is the solution of the LCP(p(λ)), thus
x(λ) = B(p(λ)). (2.10)
Substituting (2.10) into (2.7) and (2.8), we see that p(λ) ∈ SJ . This shows the
convexity of SJ .
The equation (2.4) follows from (2.10).
Theorem 2.13. Let d be linear and η ∈ RN+ . If A is a P-matrix, the condition
(2.2) is satisfied, and for any J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} (J can be ∅) and its complement
J¯ = {1, 2, . . . , N} \ J ,
ηTJ¯ (AJ¯ J¯ − AJ¯JA−1JJAJJ¯) ≥ 0, (2.11)
then the demand function D : RN+ → RN+ defined in Definition 2.5 exhibits the
following property:
ηTD(p′) ≤ ηTD(p), ∀ p′ ≥ p ≥ 0,
that is, the total demand (with weight η) does not increase if no price decreases.
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Proof. For any p, p′ in RN+ such that p
′ ≥ p, let x = B(p) and x′ = B(p′). By
Assumption 1, x, x′ ∈ Ω.
Firstly, consider p and p′ which satisfy
dJ(x) = dJ(x





for some J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
If J = ∅, then x = p and x′ = p′. Thus,
ηT (D(p′)−D(p)) = ηT (d(p′)− d(p))
= −ηTA(p′ − p)
≤ 0,
where the last inequality holds because ηTA ≥ 0 by condition (2.11), and p′−p ≥ 0.
Now we assume J 6= ∅. From (2.12), it follows that
x′J − xJ = −A−1JJAJJ¯(p′J¯ − pJ¯)
Then
ηT (D(p′)−D(p)) = ηT (d(x′)− d(x))
= ηTJ¯ (dJ¯(x
′)− dJ¯(x))
= −ηTJ¯ (AJ¯J(x′J − xJ) + AJ¯ J¯(p′J¯ − pJ¯))
= −ηTJ¯ (AJ¯ J¯ − AJ¯JA−1JJAJJ¯)(p′J¯ − pJ¯).
Since (p′
J¯
− pJ¯) is an arbitrary nonnegative vector, ηT (D(p′) − D(p)) ≤ 0 if and
only if the condition (2.11) holds.
Now for any p ≤ p′ in RN+ , denote p(t) = p + t(p′ − p). Then we shall show
ηTD(p(0)) ≥ ηTD(p(1)). By the complementarity conditions, at any pˆ ∈ RN+ ,
there is a Jˆ (Jˆ can be ∅) and ¯ˆJ = {1, 2, . . . , N} \ Jˆ such that
DJˆ(pˆ) = 0, pˆ ¯ˆJ = xˆ ¯ˆJ
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hold.
Let TJˆ be the set of all t ∈ [0, 1] such that
dJˆ(x(t)) = 0, p ¯ˆJ(t) = x ¯ˆJ(t).
We will first show that TJˆ is a convex and closed set. Suppose t˜, tˇ ∈ TJˆ , consider
t = λt˜+ (1− λ)tˇ, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
p(t) = p+ t(p′ − p) = λp(t˜) + (1− λ)p(tˇ).
Since p(t˜), p(tˇ) ∈ SJˆ and SJˆ is convex by Lemma 2.12, we have p(t) ∈ SJˆ , i.e.,
t ∈ TJˆ . So TJˆ is convex, i.e., it is an interval.
For any convergent sequence {tk} in TJˆ , which converges to, say, t¯, we need to
show t¯ ∈ TJˆ . By the 2nd part of Lemma 2.12, the map B is linear and hence
is continuous on SJˆ . Also, p(t) is clearly continuous. Thus as tk → t¯, we have
p(tk) → p(t¯) and x(tk) → x(t¯). Since d is continuous and dJˆ(x(tk)) = 0 for each
k, dJˆ(x(t¯)) = 0. In addition, as p ¯ˆJ(tk) = x ¯ˆJ(tk) for each k, we have p ¯ˆJ(t¯) = x ¯ˆJ(t¯).
That is, t¯ ∈ TJˆ and thus, TJˆ is a closed interval.
We can then write for each index set Ji (Ji can be ∅) and J¯i = {1, 2, . . . , N} \ Ji,
DJi(p(t)) = 0, p(t)J¯i = x(t)J¯i , ∀t ∈ [ti, ti+1].
Note that the number of such sub-intervals of t is finite, since there is only a finite
number of distinct sets Ji.
For any two points on the line segment connecting p(ti) and p(ti+1), the condition
(2.12) holds for Ji. Thus, as shown above, we have η
TD(p(ti)) ≥ ηTD(p(ti+1)).
This leads to ηTD(p) ≥ ηTD(p′).
If the market we consider consists of mutually substitutable products, then the
following result follows.
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Corollary 2.14. If d is linear and A is a weighted column dominant (i.e., ηTA ≥ 0,
where η ∈ RN+ ) P-matrix with aij ≤ 0 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j 6= i and b ≥ 0, then
ηTD(p′)− ηTD(p) ≤ 0, ∀ p′ ≥ p ≥ 0.
Proof. First we note that if A is a P-matrix with non-positive off-diagonal entries
and b ≥ 0, Assumption 1 is satisfied.





AJ¯J AJ¯ J¯ − AJ¯JA−1JJAJJ¯
.
Since A is weighted column dominant, ηTA ≥ 0. By our hypothesis on A, A is
an M-matrix, i.e., A−1JJ ≥ 0 (all entries are nonnegative), and thus Q ≥ 0. Then
ηTAQ ≥ 0 follows and ηT
J¯
(AJ¯ J¯ − AJ¯JA−1JJAJJ¯) ≥ 0.
All conditions in Theorem 2.13 are satisfied. The proof is completed by using
Theorem 2.13.
Theorem 2.13 and Corollary 2.14 show that ηTD(p) decreases as p increases.
This seems to be a natural extension of the monotonicity of demand from a one-
product market to a multiple-product market. However, since p ∈ RN+ is not
totally ordered, the condition that p increases covers only a very limited situation.
Moreover, expressing the monotonicity of a vector D(p) by the monotonicity of
ηTD(p) also sacrifices generality.
The second inequality
(p′ − p)T (D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ 0, ∀p, p′ ∈ RN+ ,
is a more appropriate expression of monotonicity for a multiple-product system.
Moreover, this monotonicity property of D is desirable in theoretical analysis and
has been used as a condition in many research papers, see for example, Perakis
and Sood [71].
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Theorem 2.15. Under Assumption 1, if d is monotonically decreasing on RN+ ,
then the demand function D : RN+ → RN+ defined in Definition 2.5 is monotonically
decreasing. That is,
(p′ − p)T (D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ 0, ∀ p, p′ ∈ RN+ .
Proof. For any p, p′ ∈ RN+ , denote x = B(p) and x′ = B(p′). We will first prove
that
((p′ − x′)− (p− x)) · (D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ 0, ∀ p, p′ ∈ RN+ . (2.13)
Now
((p′ − x′)− (p− x)) · (D(p′)−D(p)) = (p′ − x′)TD(p′)− (p′ − x′)TD(p)
−(p− x)TD(p′) + (p− x)TD(p)
= (p′ − x′)Td(x′)− (p′ − x′)Td(x)
−(p− x)Td(x′) + (p− x)Td(x)
= −(p′ − x′)Td(x)− (p− x)Td(x′)
≤ 0,
where the third equality follows from the complementarity constraints (p′−x′)Td(x′) =
(p − x)Td(x) = 0, and the inequality is due to the nonnegativity constraints on
p′ − x′, p− x, d(x′) and d(x). Thus (2.13) is true.
This implies that ∀ p, p′,
(p′ − p)T (D(p′)−D(p)) ≤ (x′ − x) · (D(p′)−D(p))
= (x′ − x) · (d(x′)− d(x))
≤ 0,
since x, x′ ≥ 0 under Assumption 1 and d is monotonically decreasing on RN+ . Thus
we are done.
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Note that if d is linear, d is monotonically decreasing if A is positive semidefinite.
Then it follows from the above theorem that D is monotonically decreasing.
Hitherto, we have discussed the construction of a demand system via a Nonlin-
ear Complementarity Problem, together with its motivation, and some associated
properties. We will now investigate an important application of demand functions,




As competition intensifies, more products are offered in markets and their rela-
tionships become more complex. Thus good pricing models become core decision
tools for corporations’ revenue management. The goal of this section is to study
game-theoretic pricing models in which the demand functions described in the pre-
ceding section are used. Since in these models, the demand at each p is in fact
evaluated at B(p), the complementarity constraints present in the NCP becomes
part of the model’s pricing constraints. Thus, the best response problem facing
each seller is an NCP constrained optimization problem, or a Mathematical Pro-
gram with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), as named in Luo, Pang and Ralph
[60].
An interesting result is that, in some cases, the NCP constraints in the pricing
model can be eliminated to obtain a simplified model. This reduction implicitly
ensures that only p ∈ Ω needs to be considered, thus simplifying theoretical and
computational analyses. However, there are also situations in which the pricing
57
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models involve more complicated constraints and so the aforementioned simpli-
fication cannot be realized. In such situations, the complementarity constraints
inherited from the complementarity-based demand functions will remain as a core
structure in pricing models.
3.1 Deterministic NCP-constrained Pricing Mod-
els
A general pricing model in an (oligopolistic) market of M sellers can be described





s.t. pi ∈ Gi(p−i) (3.1)
pi ≥ 0,
where pi ∈ RNi is the subvector of prices corresponding to the Ni products offered
by seller i1, p−i is the subvector consisting of all subvectors pj except pi, F i is
the profit function of seller i. Furthermore, pi ∈ Gi(p−i) represents the additional
constraints on prices to be set by seller i, when the prices of other sellers, p−i
are given. Prices are nonnegative, thus pi ≥ 0 is required. We denote N =
N1 + · · ·+NM .
TheM sellers in the market solve their best response problems simultaneously to
obtain a Nash Equilibrium pricing policy p∗ = (p1∗, p2∗, . . . , pM∗). In our case, each
seller’s strategy set (set of possible prices) can depend on other sellers’ strategies
1Note that in this thesis, we use pi to denote the price of a single product i, and pi to denote
the column vector of prices of all the products offered by seller i.
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(prices), hence to be more exact, p∗ is called a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (in
short GNE, as discussed in Harker [44] and Pang [67]). Equivalently, it means that
for each seller i, F i(pi∗, p−i∗) ≥ F i(pi, p−i∗), ∀ pi ≥ 0, pi ∈ Gi(p−i∗).
Here we propose a pricing model which incorporates the special structure of our
demand function. In general, the profit function depends on price and demand.
Since our demand is, in essence, a function of the projected price, namely, D(p) =
d(B(p)), we can write the objective function in terms of p and B(p). As we will
explain later, it suffices to consider an objective function dependent only on the





s.t. pi ∈ Gi(p−i) (3.2)
pi ≥ 0.
Notice that the function f i need only be defined on Ω because B(p) ∈ Ω for all
p ∈ RN+ (under Assumption 1). We will describe the function f i for some specific
pricing models below.





s.t. 0 ≤ d(x) ⊥ p− x ≥ 0 (3.3)
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0.
Note that x and p are of N -dimension while xi and pi are their subvectors of Ni-
dimension. We also notice that x in different best response problems, e.g. for sellers
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i and j respectively, represents different variables. However, under Assumption 1,
if p∗ = (p1∗, p2∗, . . . , pM∗) is an equilibrium, then the solution x∗ is the same for all
the best response problems. This is because x∗ solves the NCP
0 ≤ d(x) ⊥ p∗ − x ≥ 0
for the same p∗ and the NCP has a unique solution.
The model (3.3) is an NCP constrained optimization problem. Readers can refer
to Luo, Pang and Ralph [60] for general properties of such problems and methods
to solve them.
We can consider a more general objective function f i(p, x) depending on both
the price p and the projected price x. But it does not gain much generality, and
Proposition 3.2 below shows that the model (3.3) is sufficiently general. Thus, we
consider f i(x) to avoid involving additional conditions with regard to the depen-
dence of f i on p.










where qi ∈ RNi is the vector representing the quantities of the various products to
be produced by seller i, constrained to be nonnegative and by the corresponding
market demand; qi ∈ Qi represents any additional constraints on the quantities to
be produced/sold; ci : R
Ni
+ → R is the cost function; and Di : RN+ → RNi+ is the
demand function for seller i’s products.
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We will show in Proposition 3.2 that the model (3.4) can be considered as a
special case of the model (3.3) if we define f i(x) via an optimization problem. We
will show some useful properties of the function f i so defined. In particular, we
wish to prove the continuity of f i. The proof of the continuity of f i involves the
continuity of a set-valued mapping. There are many existing results which can
show the continuity of a set-valued mapping on the interior of its domain, e.g.,
see Example 5.10 in Rockafellar and Wets [79]. However, it is highly non-trivial
to extend this continuity to the boundary of the domain. We found that some
conditions are sufficient for our purpose, as explained in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let Q ⊆ RV be a polyhedral set bounded from below (e.g., q ≥ 0 ∀
q ∈ Q), and d : X ⊆ RU → RV be a continuous function, where X is a closed set.
Define Γ : RU → RV to be a set-valued map such that Γ(x) = {q ∈ Q | q ≤ d(x)},
given any x ∈ RU . Then
(i) the domain of Γ, dom(Γ) := {x ∈ X |Γ(x) 6= ∅}, and the graph of Γ, gr(Γ) :=
{(x, q) |x ∈ dom(Γ), q ∈ Γ(x)} are closed;
(ii) Γ is continuous on dom(Γ), i.e., Γ is upper and lower semicontinuous on
dom(Γ) (see the proof below for the detailed definition of semicontinuity);
Proof. (i) We will prove concurrently that the domain and graph of Γ are closed.
Let xk ∈ dom(Γ) be a sequence converging to x¯, and let B(x¯) be the closed ball
centered at x¯ with radius 1. We may assume (WLOG) that xk ∈ B(x¯) for all k.
Define d¯ := max{d(x) |x ∈ B(x¯)∩X} (note that d¯ exists as d is continuous on the
compact set B(x¯) ∩ X). For each xk, there is a corresponding qk ∈ Γ(xk). Since
qk ∈ Γ(B(x¯) ∩X) ⊆ Q ∩ { q | q ≤ d¯} (a compact set) for each k, the sequence {qk}
is bounded and there exists a convergent subsequence that converges to a point q¯.
We need to show q¯ ∈ Γ(x¯). Here qk ∈ Γ(xk) implies qk ∈ Q and qk ≤ d(xk). It is
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clear that q¯ ∈ Q because Q is closed. The continuity of d implies that as xk → x¯,
d(xk) → d(x¯) and so q¯ ≤ d(x¯). Thus q¯ ∈ Γ(x¯), i.e., Γ(x¯) 6= ∅. In addition, x¯ ∈ X
(since X is closed). So x¯ ∈ dom(Γ) and dom(Γ) is closed. The above proof also
shows that for any xk ∈ dom(Γ) converging to x¯ and qk ∈ Γ(xk) converging to q¯,
we have x¯ ∈ dom(Γ) and q¯ ∈ Γ(x¯). Thus, (x¯, q¯) ∈ gr(Γ), i.e., gr(Γ) is closed.
(ii) To prove the continuity of Γ on dom(Γ), it is equivalent to showing that Γ
is upper and lower semicontinuous on dom(Γ), as mentioned in Definition 1.4.3
on page 40 of Aubin and Frankowska [3]. We will first show that Γ is upper
semicontinuous on dom(Γ). By Definition 1.4.1 on page 38 of [3], a set-valued map
F : X Ã Y is upper semicontinuous at x ∈ X if and only if for any neighborhood
U of F (x), ∃ η > 0 such that ∀ x′ ∈ BX(x, η) (the intersection of X and the ball
centered at x with radius η), F (x′) ⊂ U . F is said to be upper semicontinuous if
and only if it is upper semicontinuous at any point of X.
Consider an x¯ ∈ dom(Γ). Let B(x¯) and d¯ be as defined in the proof of (i), and
Y := Q ∩ { q | q ≤ d¯}. Then ∀ x ∈ B(x¯) ∩X, Γ(x) ⊆ Y (a compact set).
To show the continuity of Γ at x¯, we need only to consider its restriction Γ :
B(x¯) ∩X → Y .
Using part (i) for the closed set B(x¯)∩X, we can see that dom(Γ) and gr(Γ) are
closed. Since Q is closed, given any x ∈ dom(Γ), Γ(x) = Q∩{q | q ≤ d(x)} is closed.
Therefore, by Proposition 1.4.8 (on page 42) in [3], the map Γ : B(x¯) ∩X → Y is
upper semicontinuous.
We now prove that Γ is lower semicontinuous at x¯. That is, ∀ xk ∈ dom(Γ)
converging to x¯, ∀ q¯ ∈ Γ(x¯), ∃ qk ∈ Γ(xk) such that qk → q¯ (c.f. Definition 1.4.2
on page 39 of [3]).
If Γ is not lower semicontinuous at x¯, then ∃ xk(∈ dom(Γ)) → x¯, a q¯ ∈ Γ(x¯),
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and an ² > 0 such that ∀ qk ∈ Γ(xk), ‖qk− q¯‖ ≥ ². Let qpk be the projection of q¯ on
Γ(xk). Again, the closed ball B(x¯) is assumed to contain xk for all k. As before,
we can find a d¯ such that qpk ∈ Q ∩ { q | q ≤ d¯} (a compact set). Thus there exists
a subsequence {qpk} that converges to qˆ. It is clear that ‖qpk − q¯‖ ≥ ² ∀ k and also
‖qˆ − q¯‖ ≥ ².
We will prove the lower semicontinuity of Γ in the following steps. First, we
will show that (a) qpk 6= qˆ for infinitely many k. Then for all qpk 6= qˆ, since Q is
polyhedral, ∃ qbk ∈ ∂Q (the boundary of Q) on the line through the points qpk and
qˆ, but closer to qpk, where the active set of constraints at q
b
k differs from that at qˆ.
That is, ∃ δ > 0 such that ‖qbk − qˆ‖ ≥ δ ∀ k where qpk 6= qˆ.
We go on to prove that (b) for all qpk 6= qˆ but sufficiently close to qˆ, ∃ λk → 1
as k →∞ such that qpk + λk(q¯ − qˆ) ∈ conv{q¯, qbk, qˆ} ⊂ Q. Lastly, we need to show
that (c) for the same qpk and λk described in (b), q
p
k + λk(q¯ − qˆ) ≤ d(xk).
Then since qpk+λk(q¯−qˆ)→ q¯ as k →∞, and (b) and (c) imply that qpk+λk(q¯−qˆ) ∈
Γ(xk), there exists a point (e.g., q
p
k + λk(q¯ − qˆ)) which is closer to q¯ than the
projection qpk, and we have a contradiction. Hence, once (a), (b) and (c) are
proven, the lower semicontinuity of Γ at x¯ is shown.
To show (a), suppose ∃ infinitely many xk → x¯ such that qpk = qˆ (6= q¯) ∀ k. We
can see that qˆ 6≥ q¯, since otherwise, d(xk) ≥ qpk = qˆ ≥ q¯ implies q¯ ∈ Γ(xk), i.e.,
qpk = q¯ (a contradiction). Thus, ∃ I and J (6= ∅) such that qˆJ < q¯J and qˆI ≥ q¯I .
It is clear that dI(xk) ≥ qˆI ≥ q¯I for all k. Since d is continuous, as xk → x¯,
dJ(xk)→ dJ(x¯) ≥ q¯J . Thus, ∃ ²0 > 0 such that q¯j ≥ qˆj + ²0 and dj(xk) ≥ qˆj + ²0,
for all j ∈ J and all k such that xk is sufficiently close to x¯.
Let q(t) = tqˆ + (1 − t)q¯. Since Q is convex, q(t) ∈ Q for all t ∈ [0, 1]. We have
qI(t) ≤ dI(xk) ∀ t ∈ [0, 1], as qˆI ≥ q¯I . Now qJ(t) ≤ dJ(xk) if tqˆj+(1−t)q¯j ≤ qˆj+²0 ∀
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j ∈ J , i.e., if (1−t)(q¯j− qˆj) ≤ ²0. By the definition of ²0, we have 0 < min
j∈J
²0
q¯j − qˆj ≤
1. Let t∗ = 1 −min
j∈J
²0
q¯j − qˆj . Then 0 ≤ t
∗ < 1 and qJ(t∗) ≤ dJ(xk), implying that
q(t∗) ∈ Γ(xk). But ‖q(t∗) − q¯‖ < ‖qˆ − q¯‖ (since t∗ < 1) = ‖qpk − q¯‖, contradicting
the fact that qpk is the projection of q¯ on Γ(xk).
We will now prove (b) and (c). By the definition of qbk, we can write q
p
k = sqˆ+(1−
s)qbk for some s ∈ (0, 1), for qpk 6= qˆ. Thus, qpk+λ(q¯− qˆ) = (s−λ)qˆ+(1− s)qbk+λq¯.
It is easy to see that qpk + λ(q¯ − qˆ) ∈ conv{q¯, qbk, qˆ} as long as s ≥ λ ≥ 0. Thus for
all qpk sufficiently close to qˆ, i.e., s sufficiently close to 1 (as ‖qbk− qˆ‖ ≥ δ), ∃ λ
′
k → 1
such that ∀ λ ∈ [0, λ′k], qpk + λ(q¯ − qˆ) ∈ conv{q¯, qbk, qˆ}.
We need to show qpk + λ(q¯ − qˆ) ≤ d(xk) for some λ < 1 and sufficiently close
to 1. For all j ∈ I, q¯j ≤ qˆj. Thus for any arbitrary λ ≥ 0, since d(xk) ≥ qpk, we
have λ(q¯j − qˆj) ≤ dj(xk) − (qpk)j. Now for all j ∈ J , q¯j > qˆj, dj(x¯)−qˆjq¯j−qˆj ≥ 1; and
dj(xk)−dj(x¯)+qˆj−(qpk)j
q¯j−qˆj → 0 as k →∞, since q
p
k → qˆ and d is continuous, i.e, dj(xk)→
dj(x¯). Hence, ∃ λ′′k → 1 such that ∀ λ ∈ [0, λ′′k], λ ≤ dj(x¯)−qˆjq¯j−qˆj +
dj(xk)−dj(x¯)+qˆj−(qpk)j
q¯j−qˆj ,
or equivalently, qpk + λ(q¯ − qˆ) ≤ d(xk).
Let λk = min{λ′k, λ′′k}. It is clear that qpk + λ(q¯ − qˆ) ∈ conv{q¯, qbk, qˆ} and qpk +
λ(q¯ − qˆ) ≤ d(xk) for all λ ∈ [0, λk], i.e., (b) and (c) are shown.
Therefore, Γ is continuous at x¯. Since x¯ ∈ dom(Γ) is arbitrary, Γ is continuous
on dom(Γ) and the proof of the lemma is completed.
Proposition 3.2. The pricing model (3.4) with D defined by Definition 2.5 is a
special case of the model (3.3) with
f i(x) = max
qi
{qi Txi − ci(qi) | 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(x), qi ∈ Qi }. (3.5)
In addition,
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(i) for any (xi, x−i), (xi, x˜−i) ∈ Ω with x−i ≤ x˜−i, if di(xi, x−i) ≤ di(xi, x˜−i), then
f i(xi, x−i) ≤ f i(xi, x˜−i);
(ii) if [a] ci is continuous, [b] d
i is continuous, and [c] Qi is a polyhedral set, then
f i is continuous on its effective domain, i.e., the set of x at which the maxi-
mization problem in (3.5) is feasible. More precisely, denoting Γ(x) = {qi ∈
Qi | 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(x)}, the effective domain is dom(Γ) = {x ∈ RN |Γ(x) 6= ∅}.






s.t. 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(x)




For each j, if pj > xj, then by the complementary condition, dj(x) = 0, which
implies qj = 0 and qjxj = qjpj = 0. Thus, q
i Txi = qi
T
pi holds true for any




Then defining f i as in (3.5), the model (3.6) can be formulated as (3.3).
(i) Suppose that for any (xi, x−i), (xi, x˜−i) ∈ Ω with x−i ≤ x˜−i, we have di(xi, x−i) ≤
di(xi, x˜−i). This implies that the feasible region of the problem described by rela-
tion (3.5) is larger at (xi, x˜−i). It is clear then that f i(xi, x−i) ≤ f i(xi, x˜−i).
(ii) Let Q = Qi∩RNi+ and X = RN . Then Γ is continuous on dom(Γ) by Lemma
3.1 (ii), given that [b] and [c] holds. By the continuity of ci, the function g(q
i, x) :=
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qi
T
xi − ci(qi) is clearly continuous. Since Q is closed, Γ(x) = {qi ∈ Q | qi ≤ di(x)}
is closed for any x ∈ dom(Γ). In addition, the continuity of di and the fact that
Γ(x) ⊆ {qi | 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(x)} imply Γ(x) is bounded for any x ∈ dom(Γ). So Γ(x)
is compact for any x ∈ dom(Γ). By Theorem 1.4.16 (Maximum Theorem) in [3],
the function f i(x) = max
qi∈Γ(x)
g(qi, x) is continuous on dom(Γ).
It is easy to see that under very mild conditions the problem (3.3) is feasible and
bounded. However, the set of optimal solutions of (3.3) can either be empty or
have multiple solutions, because the feasible region need not be closed and convex.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the simple case where d is linear andM = 1.
For convenience, we omit the index for company. We denote
B(G) = { x | x = B(p), p ∈ G, p ≥ 0},




s.t. x ∈ B(G)
The set B(G) is the image of the set G ∩ RN+ under the mapping B. Usually,
such a set is nonconvex even if G is convex. Thus the above program is in general
nonconvex. Moreover, B(G) need not be closed even if G is closed, thus although
the above problem may be bounded, it may not achieve an optimal solution.
Example 3.3. Figure 3.1 shows an example in which Ω and G are two-dimensional
sets. Here B(G) consists of two line segments U1U2 and U2U3, excluding the point
U3. Thus, B(G) is neither convex nor closed.














































































































Figure 3.1: B(G) is neither convex nor closed.
Note that even if the constraint pi ∈ Gi(p−i) is absent, the problem (3.3) is still
nonconvex in general, as shown through the following example.
Example 3.4. Consider a simple pricing problem of the form (3.6), where a single
seller offers 2 products, d is linear, c(q) = 0 and G = Q = R2+ (omitting the index
of company for convenience). Since c(q) = 0 and Q = R2+, q = b − Ax = D(p) at
optimality. Thus, the problem (3.6) can be rewritten as
max F (p) = pTD(p) (3.7)
s.t. p ≥ 0.
















































































































































Figure 3.2: Illustration of some mapped prices.
In Figure 3.2, we see that D1(p¯) = d1(B(p¯)) = 0, D2(p¯) = d2(B(p¯)) > 0,
D1(pˆ) = d1(B(pˆ)) > 0, D2(pˆ) = d2(B(pˆ)) = 0, and D1(p˜) = D2(p˜) = 0.
Thus, at the prices p˜, p¯ and pˆ, we have the objective values F (p˜) = p˜1D1(p˜) +
p˜2D2(p˜) = 0, F (p¯) = p¯2D2(p¯) > 0 and F (pˆ) = pˆ1D1(pˆ) > 0 respectively. Since
p˜ = λp¯+ (1− λ)pˆ for some λ ∈ (0, 1), but F (p˜) < λF (p¯) + (1− λ)F (pˆ), it is clear
that the objective function of problem (3.7) is not concave, that is, problem (3.7)
is nonconvex.
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3.2 Possible Simplifications
It is not easy to solve problem (3.3) because it involves NCP constraints. In what
follows, we will discuss the cases in which some complementarity constraints can
be eliminated and thus computations can be simplified.
For convenience, henceforth we will say that for any model (A), the game (A) is
the game involving the best response model (A).
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
the set Ii ⊆ Ni (Ii can be empty) is such that for any p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN+ , pi ∈
Gi(p




s.t. dIi(x) ≥ 0, xIi = pIi
0 ≤ dI˜i(x) ⊥ pI˜i − xI˜i ≥ 0 (3.8)
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0,
(where I˜i = N \ Ii), in the sense that, if p∗ is a GNE of the game (3.8), then p∗ is
a GNE of the game (3.3).
Proof. Suppose that p∗ is a GNE of the game (3.8) with corresponding x∗. That
is, (pi∗, x∗) is optimal to (3.8) for each i = 1, . . . ,M . It is clear that (pi∗, x∗) is
feasible to (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗.
Let (pˆi, xˆ) be feasible to (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗. Denote p¯i such that p¯Ii = xˆIi
and p¯Ni\Ii = pˆNi\Ii . Then we have 0 ≤ dNi\Ii(xˆ) ⊥ p¯Ni\Ii − xˆNi\Ii ≥ 0. Since xˆ
is feasible, we have dIi(xˆ) ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ d−i(xˆ) ⊥ p−i∗ − xˆ−i ≥ 0. Thus, all the
complementarity constraints in (3.8) are satisfied by (p¯i, xˆ) . In addition, given that
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the above hypothesis holds, pˆi ∈ Gi(p−i∗) implies (xˆIi , pˆNi\Ii) ∈ Gi(p−i∗). That is,
p¯i ∈ Gi(p−i∗). This means that (p¯i, xˆ) is feasible to (3.8), given p−i = p−i∗.
Since (pi∗, x∗) is optimal to (3.8), we have f i(xˆ) ≤ f i(x∗). This implies that
(pi∗, x∗) is optimal to (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗. Thus p∗ is also a GNE of the game
(3.3).
The above theorem allows us to reduce some complementarity constraints (in
(3.3)) to simple inequality constrains (in (3.8)). This reduction can significantly
simplify the computation and theoretical analysis. More evidences of this effect
will be provided later.
The main condition warranting this reduction is “pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies (BIi(p), pNi\Ii)
∈ Gi(p−i) for Ii ⊆ Ni”. Example 3.10 below will illustrate this condition and the
consequent model reduction. In many pricing problems, the constraint pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
is absent. In such cases, the aforementioned condition is satisfied trivially for
Ii = Ni, and thus the reduction is admissible.
Since the extreme case Ii = Ni also holds in many other circumstances, i.e. for
any p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN+ , pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i), we shall now pay




s.t. di(x) ≥ 0, xi = pi
0 ≤ d−i(x) ⊥ p−i − x−i ≥ 0
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0.
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Surprisingly, the model can be much further simplified, as shown below in The-




s.t. di(p) ≥ 0 (3.9)
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0,
in the sense that, if p∗ is a GNE of the game (3.9), p∗ is also a GNE of the game
(3.3). (Sometimes we say that (3.9) is ‘equivalent’ to (3.3).)
The equivalence of the problems (3.3) and (3.9) seems very unlikely, because the
problem (3.3) is highly nonconvex due to the NCP constraints, while the problem
(3.9) is convex under simple conditions such as f i, di being concave and Gi(p
−i)
being a convex set. It is interesting that problems (3.3) and (3.9) can be proven
to be equivalent.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied and that ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M ,
(i) f i(pi, p−i) ≤ f i(pi, p˜−i), di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(pi, p˜−i), for any (pi, p−i), (pi, p˜−i) ∈ Ω
with p−i ≤ p˜−i.
(ii) for any p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN+ , pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i).
Then if p∗ is a GNE of the game (3.9), p∗ is also a GNE of the game (3.3).
Proof. Let p∗ be an equilibrium of (3.9). Then di(p∗) ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,M and
p∗ ∈ Ω. Hence, (pi, x) = (pi∗, p∗) is a feasible solution to (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗.
Let (p˜i, x˜) be a feasible solution of (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗. Since x˜ is the solution
of the NCP corresponding to p = (p˜i, p−i∗), we have x˜−i ≤ p−i∗ and thus
di(x˜ i, p−i∗) ≥ di(x˜ i, x˜−i) ≥ 0. (3.10)
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Now because x˜ = B(p˜i, p−i∗), by condition (ii) in the theorem, p˜i ∈ Gi(p−i∗) implies
x˜ i ∈ Gi(p−i∗). Also, x˜ i ≥ 0 under Assumption 1. Thus, x˜ i is feasible to (3.9) given
p−i = p−i∗, where pi∗ is the optimal solution. Therefore,
f i(x˜ i, p−i∗) ≤ f i(pi∗, p−i∗).
Since x˜−i ≤ p−i∗ implies f i(x˜) ≤ f i(x˜ i, p−i∗), we have
f i(x˜) ≤ f i(pi∗, p−i∗).
This shows that (pi, x) = (pi∗, p∗) is an optimal solution of (3.3) given p−i = p−i∗.
Therefore p∗ is an equilibrium of the game defined by the best response problem
(3.3).
Note that f i(pi, p−i) ≤ f i(pi, p˜−i) is easily a consequence of di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(pi, p˜−i),
as can be seen in Proposition 3.2. The condition di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(pi, p˜−i) for any
(pi, p−i), (pi, p˜−i) ∈ Ω with p−i ≤ p˜−i, implies that seller i′s products are substi-
tutable for seller k′s products. For the linear d case, this translates into Aik ≤ 0 ∀
i, k, k 6= i, where Aik denotes the submatrix of A consisting of rows corresponding
to seller i′s products and columns corresponding to seller k′s products. However,
note that the products sold by a seller can either be substitutes or complements
for each other, because they are not restricted by the above condition.
As we mentioned earlier, if the constraint pi ∈ Gi(p−i) is absent in (3.3), the
condition that pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i) is trivially satisfied. In the
papers Bernstein and Federgruen [8], Dai, Chao, Fang and Nuttle [26], Gallego
and Van Ryzin [41], Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis [42], Maglaras and Meissner
[61], and Roy, Hanssens and Raju [81], either no additional constraints on pi are
explicitly mentioned, i.e. pi ∈ Gi(p−i) is absent, or pi is constrained to lie in
some interval [pmin, pmax]. Note that if pmin = 0, it is easy to see that condition
(ii) in Theorem 3.6 will be satisfied, since Bi(p) ≥ 0 (under Assumption 1) and
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Bi(p) ≤ pi ≤ pmax holds. Thus the simpler pricing model (3.9) can be used instead
of model (3.3) in solving the game. In this case, Theorem 3.6 can be viewed as a
rigorous justification for the validity of the pricing models discussed in their papers.
The reduced model mentioned in Theorem 3.6 is much simpler than the model in
Theorem 3.5, and is not simply a special case (Ii = Ni for all i = 1, . . . ,M) of the
model discussed in Theorem 3.5. The model (3.9) does not involve complementarity
constraints of other players while the model (3.8) does. Such a further simplification
is made possible only when ALL sellers’ pricing constraints satisfy the hypothesis
(ii), and products by different sellers are mutually substitutable, i.e. condition (i)
holds. We notice that, even if the condition (ii) is satisfied, it may not be possible
to reduce the game (3.3) to the game (3.9) if condition (i) is not satisfied, i.e. if
seller i’s products are not assumed substitutable for seller k’s products, ∀ i 6= k.
The following example shows that an equilibrium for the game (3.9) need not be an
equilibrium for the game (3.3), even for pricing games with very simple constraint
sets, namely Gi = Qi = R
Ni
+ .
Example 3.7. Suppose there are 2 sellers in the market, model (3.6) is considered,
seller 1 produces products 1 and 2, q1 = (q1; q2), and seller 2 produces product
3, q2 = q3. Let d1(p) = 20 − 2p1 − 3p3, d2(p) = 13 − 2p2 − p3 and d3(p) =
10− 1.5p2 − 1.5p3. The cost functions facing the sellers are c1(q1) = 0q1 + 5q2 and
c2(q
2) = 0q3. In addition, let Q1 = G1 = R
2
+ and Q2 = G2 = R
1
+. It is easy to
show that the matrix A is a P-matrix and condition (ii) in Theorem 3.6 is satisfied.
We obtained p1∗ = (4.61, 5.62), p2∗ = 0.52 to be a Nash Equilibrium of the game
(3.9), with corresponding q1∗ = (9.21, 1.24), q2∗ = 0.79 (using the programs given
in Appendix A). It is easy to verify this NE. At this equilibrium, the profits for
seller 1 and seller 2 are 43.27 and 0.41 respectively.
Now, we check if the above equilibrium is also an equilibrium for the game (3.6).
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Let us look at the best response problem (3.6) for seller 1, given p2 = p3 = 0.52
fixed. Consider the vectors p¯1 = (p¯1, p¯2) = (4.75, 6.33), q¯
1 = (q¯1, q¯2) = (9.5, 0) and
x¯ = (4.75, 6.33, 0.33). It is easy to check that all the constraints of (3.6) for seller
1 are satisfied. At this feasible solution, we find that the profit seller 1 obtains is
45.13, higher than 43.27 obtained at p1∗ = (4.61, 5.62). This shows that p1∗ is not
a best response to p2∗ = 0.52 for the game (3.6). Thus, (p1∗, p2∗) is not a Nash
Equilibrium of the game (3.6).
Hence, in general, a GNE of the game (3.9) need not be a GNE of the game
(3.3).
In addition, one may ask this: Suppose that (p∗, x∗, q∗) is a Nash Equilibrium
of a game involving best response model (3.6), and which satisfies Assumption 1.
Under the hypothesis “for any p ∈ RN+ , pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i) for
all i = 1, . . . ,M”, can we say that (x∗, x∗, q∗) is also a Nash Equilibrium of (3.6)?
We will answer this question with the following example.
Example 3.8. Consider 2 sellers in the market, offering 1 product each. Then
qi = qi and p
i = pi, for i = 1, 2. Let d1(p) = 10−2p1−p2 and d2(p) = 18−p1−2p2.
The cost functions facing the sellers are c1(q1) = 10q1 and c2(q2) = 5q2. In addition,
let Q1 = G1 = Q2 = G2 = R
1
+. As before, it is clear that A is a P-matrix and the
above hypothesis holds. In addition, Assumption 1 is satisfied due to Lemma 2.8
(since a11, a22 and A
−1b > 0).
We will show that a Nash Equilibrium of the game involving these 2 sellers
and model (3.6) is p∗ = (20, 41/6), with corresponding x∗ = (19/12, 41/6) and
q∗ = (0, 11/4). (We obtained this NE using Appendix B’s programs).
For convenience, let x[k] denote the mapped price vector for seller k. Suppose
we fix p2 = 41/6 and solve (3.6) for seller 1. Consider case (i): x[1]2 = p2 = 41/6.
Then the constraints of (3.6) are reduced to 0 ≤ 19/6 − 2x[1]1 ⊥ p1 − x[1]1 ≥ 0,
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p1 ≥ 0 and x[1]1 ≤ 13/3 (from d2(x[1]) ≥ 0). Suppose x[1]1 = 19/12, then we have
q1 = d1 = 0 and a profit of $0. Now if we have p1 = x[1]1, since the objective
function becomes (x[1]1 − 10)q1, and x[1]1 ≤ 19/12 is a constraint, we can never
have a higher profit than $0.
Consider case (ii): d2(x) = 18 − x[1]1 − 2x[1]2 = 0, that is, x[1]1 = 18 − 2x[1]2.
Substituting this expression for x[1]1 into d1(x) ≥ 0, we have x[1]2 ≥ 26/3, con-
tradicting x[1]2 ≤ 41/6. Thus x[1]∗ = (19/12, 41/6), q∗1 = 0 and any p1 ≥ 19/12 is
optimal for seller 1, with optimal profit of $0. Suppose we choose p∗1 = 20.
Now suppose we fix p1 = 20 and solve (3.6) for seller 2. Consider case (a):
x[2]1 = p1 = 20. Then the constraint d1(x) ≥ 0 is reduced to x[2]2 ≤ −30, which
is impossible by Assumption 1.
Consider case (b): d1(x) = 0. That is, x[2]1 = (10 − x[2]2)/2. Then x[2]1 ≤ 20
implies x[2]2 ≥ −30, and d2(x) ≥ 0 implies x[2]2 ≤ 26/3. Suppose p2 = x[2]2. The
objective function becomes (x[2]2 − 5)q2. Recall the constraint 0 ≤ q2 ≤ d2(x).
Since if x[2]2 < 5, we should set q2 = 0 to obtain the highest objective value, and
if x[2]2 ≥ 5, we should set q2 = d2, thus the problem is reduced to maximizing
(x[2]2 − 5)d2(x) = −3/2x[2]22 + 41/2 x[2]2 − 65, subject to 5 ≤ x[2]2 ≤ 26/3. It is
easy to check that optimality occurs at x[2]2 = 41/6. Thus, a feasible solution of
(3.6) is p2 = x[2]2 = 41/6 with q2 = 11/4, x[2]1 = 19/12 and a profit of $121/24.
Now if we allow x[2]2 < p2, then d2 = 0, which will lead to a lower profit
achieved. Thus the optimal solution of seller 2 given p1 = 20, is p
∗
2 = 41/6,
x[2]∗ = (19/12, 41/6), q∗2 = 11/4, with a profit of $121/24.
We go on to investigate if (x∗, x∗, q∗) is also a Nash Equilibrium. As explained
above, given p2 = x
∗
2 = 41/6 fixed, p¯1 = 19/12, x¯[1] = (19/12, 41/6), q¯1 = 0 is an
optimal solution of (3.6) for seller 1, with a profit of $0.
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However, when we substitute p1 = x
∗
1 = 19/12 into (3.6) for seller 2, it is easy
to check that p2 = 317/48, q2 = 77/24 and x[2] = (19/12, 317/48) is feasible. A
profit of $5929/1152 (higher than $121/24) is obtained. Thus (x∗, x∗, q∗) cannot
be a Nash Equilibrium.
Let us use the above example to obtain an intuitive understanding of this phe-
nomenon. For fixed p1 = p
∗
1 = 20, when we considered case (a): x[2]1 = p1 above
in solving problem (3.6) for seller 2, we found it to be infeasible. However, if p1
is fixed to be lower at x∗1 = 19/12, then case (a): x[2]1 = p1 = 19/12 becomes
feasible. With an additional case and thus a larger feasible set to choose from, it
is then possible to achieve a better response for seller 2 than the optimal response
to fixed p1 = 20.
For the case where there is only one company (M = 1), we can present a more
specific relationship between (3.3) and (3.9). For convenience, we omit the index











s.t. d(p) ≥ 0 (3.12)
p ∈ G
p ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.9. For the case of M = 1 and under Assumption 1, if for any p ∈ RN+ ,
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p ∈ G implies B(p) ∈ G, then the models (3.11) and (3.12) are ‘equivalent’ in the
following sense:
(i) If p∗ is an optimal solution of the model (3.11), then B(p∗) is an optimal
solution of the model (3.12).
(ii) If p∗ is an optimal solution of the model (3.12), then any p ∈ RN+ satisfying
B(p) = p∗ and p ∈ G is an optimal solution of (3.11).
(iii) The models (3.11) and (3.12) have the same optimal objective values.
Proof. Let v1 and v2 be the optimal objective values of (3.11) and (3.12) respec-
tively.
Suppose that (p∗, x∗) is optimal to (3.11). Then x∗ = B(p∗). Under the hypoth-
esis in the theorem, p∗ ∈ G implies x∗ ∈ G. We have x∗ ≥ 0 (due to Assumption
1). Thus, p = x∗ is feasible to (3.12) and
v1 = f(x
∗) ≤ v2. (3.13)
If p∗ is optimal to (3.12), then for any p ∈ RN+ satisfying B(p) = p∗ and p ∈ G,
p∗ is the solution of NCP(p), i.e., 0 ≤ d(p∗) ⊥ p − p∗ ≥ 0. Hence it is easy to see
that (p, p∗) is feasible to (3.11). This means that
v2 = f(p
∗) ≤ f(x∗) = v1. (3.14)
Combining (3.13) and (3.14), we have v1 = v2 and (iii) is proven. Since the
equality holds in (3.13) and (3.14), x∗ is optimal to problem (3.12) and (p, p∗) is
optimal to problem (3.11). Thus we have proven (i) and (ii).
Note that in the above theorem, there are no specific conditions on the relation-
ship between the demand for product i and the price of product j (j 6= i). Hence,
the products may be substitutes or complements for each other.
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In what follows, we will illustrate some cases where simplifications of the NCP
constrained pricing models are possible.
Example 3.10. Consider the case of a single seller and let G := { p1 ≥ p2 }. The




s.t. 0 ≤ d1(x1, x2) ⊥ p1 − x1 ≥ 0
0 ≤ d2(x1, x2) ⊥ p2 − x2 ≥ 0






























































































Figure 3.3: Cases where simplifications of NCP constrained pricing models are
possible.
In the first diagram of Figure 3.3, all the nonnegative prices p satisfying p ∈ G\Ω,
are mapped to the line segments AB and BC, thus B(p) ∈ G. Also, for all
p ∈ Ω ∩ G, we have B(p) ∈ Ω ∩ G (since B(p) = p). Hence, the condition ‘p ∈ G
implies B(p) ∈ G’ is satisfied for all p ∈ RN+ . The model (3.11) can thus be reduced
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s.t. d1(p1, p2) ≥ 0
d2(p1, p2) ≥ 0
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ 0.
From the second diagram in Figure 3.3, we can see that all the nonnegative prices
p, with p ∈ G\Ω, are mapped to the line segment AC. It is clear that the segment
AB (excluding B) does not lie in G. That is, there exists prices like p˜, where p˜ ∈ G
but B(p˜) /∈ G. In this case, the problem (3.11) cannot be reduced to the problem
(3.12). However, the complementarity constraints in the problem (3.11) can be
partially eliminated by virtue of Theorem 3.5. Indeed, for all nonnegative p ∈ G,
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ B2(p) (as p ≥ B(p) always holds). Thus, the condition ‘p ∈ G implies





s.t. 0 ≤ d1(x1, p2) ⊥ p1 − x1 ≥ 0
d2(x1, p2) ≥ 0
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ 0.
In this section, we have exhibited some possible simplifications like (3.8), (3.9)
and (3.12) of the NCP constrained model (3.3). Indeed, it may be possible to
uncover other tractable models via simplifications of the NCP constrained model
(3.3). However, we wish to emphasize that the use of any simplified model requires
rigorous justifications, and such justifications are now made possible by virtue of
the fundamental and complete NCP constrained pricing model (3.3).
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3.3 A Random Demand Pricing Model
As it may be difficult to obtain perfect information about the demand, or rather,
the parameters defining the demand function, we now consider random demand
and incorporate this randomness into the NCP-constrained pricing model discussed
previously.
For simplicity, we will consider the randomized version of a simple form of the
pricing model (3.6). Suppose that ci(q
i) = 0, and the constraints qi ∈ Qi and




s.t. 0 ≤ d(x) ⊥ p− x ≥ 0 (3.15)
pi ≥ 0.
Let the demand d(·, ω) be associated with the random variable ω with a certain
probability distribution. Suppose that Ω is the set of all possible realizations of ω.
Given a price vector pi ∈ RNi+ (with other sellers’ prices p−i fixed), corresponding
to each realization ω ∈ Ω, there is a projected price x(ω) = B(p, ω) associated
with the realization of the random demand d(·, ω). That is, x(ω) solves the NCP:
0 ≤ d(x(ω), ω) ⊥ p − x(ω) ≥ 0. The objective is then to maximize the total
expected revenue of seller i, given other sellers’ prices p−i, through the following







s.t. 0 ≤ d(x(ω), ω) ⊥ p− x(ω) ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω (3.16)
pi ≥ 0.
This stochastic formulation is an example of a Stochastic Mathematical Program
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with Equilibrium Constraints (SMPEC), as introduced in Patriksson and Wyn-
ter [69]. The reader can refer to Patriksson and Wynter [69], and Evgrafov and
Patriksson [35] for some general properties of such problems.
As an illustration, suppose that the random variable ω is discrete with probability
µk = Prob(ω = ωk), k = 1, . . . , K. The associated projected price with ωk can be






s.t. 0 ≤ d(x(ωk), ωk) ⊥ p− x(ωk) ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K (3.17)
pi ≥ 0.
We wish to emphasize to the reader that the above stochastic problems cannot
be simplified by eliminating the complementarity constraints (as in the case of the
deterministic formulations). For example, it is not possible to reduce the problem






s.t. di(p, ωk) ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , K
pi ≥ 0.
Indeed if, instead of introducing a projected price x(ωk) for each realization ωk,
we restrict pi in Ωi(ωk) := {pi ∈ RNi+ : di(p, ωk) ≥ 0} so as to reduce the comple-
mentarity constraints in the model (3.17) to simple constraints di(p, ωk) ≥ 0, then
we would end up with the extremely restrictive choice of pi ∈ ∩Kk=1Ωi(ωk). This
is not realistic. Therefore, the complementarity-constrained pricing model (3.17)
remains necessary if random demand is considered.
Chapter 4
Nash Equilibrium Results for New Pricing
Games
An important and frequently considered theoretical issue surrounding Pricing Games
is the existence of equilibrium prices. Up to now, it remains as a difficult problem.
Traditionally, such existence results may require certain fixed point theorems (e.g.,
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, see Section 4.2).
In our work, as the best response pricing model for each seller in the pricing game
is itself a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, the pricing game is
thus an example of an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC).
In the theses by Su [89] and Ehrenmann [31], some theoretical properties and
applications of such problems were discussed. Generally, it is difficult to ensure the
existence of an EPEC solution due to the nonconvexity of the associated MPECs.
However, we will show the existence of NE for some of our new pricing games in
this chapter.
82
4.1 The Reducible Games 83
4.1 The Reducible Games
As we have mentioned above, since our pricing game is an instance of an EPEC,
the existence of a NE is difficult to ensure. Fortunately, for our reducible pricing
games, NE existence can be shown through some standard results.





s.t. 0 ≤ d(x) ⊥ p− x ≥ 0
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0,





s.t. di(p) ≥ 0
pi ∈ Gi(p−i)
pi ≥ 0.
This simplification result has significant advantages for theoretical analysis, such
as the existence of equilibrium.
Indeed, as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.6, the existence of equilibrium
prices of the pricing game (3.3) is guaranteed if the simplified game (3.9) can be
shown to have equilibria. The existence of equilibrium for the simplified game
(3.9) is a classical problem and there are abundant results on it. The conditions
for existence for any game depends largely on the emphasis placed on different
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aspects of the game. We do not attempt to make a complete list of them here.
Instead, we will just cite a classical result in Ponstein [74] to demonstrate the
existence of GNE of our pricing model (3.3).
We will need some definitions here. Let S be the joint feasible region of the
players in a game. The feasible region Gi(p
−i) of player i’s best response problem
is said to be a marginal feasible region of S if Gi(p
−i) = {pi | (pi, p−i) ∈ S}. Define
the map TS such that ∀ p ∈ S, TS(p) = { z | z ∈ S, (zi, p−i) ∈ S, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M }.
The point to set mapping TS, which maps p ∈ S onto a set TS(p) ⊆ S is said




0) is not empty, a δ > 0 can be found such that X
⋂
TS(p) is also not
empty for all p ∈ S satisfying | p − p0 | < δ. As shown in [74], if S is a convex
polyhedron, then TS is lower semicontinuous.
For clarity, we state the following theorem as given in Ponstein [74], according
to the notations used in our paper.
Theorem 4.1. Let S be a closed, bounded and convex subset of RN and TS be
a lower semicontinuous mapping. For each i = 1, . . . ,M , suppose that f i(pi, p−i)
is a continuous function of p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN , and f i(pi, p−i) is concave in pi,
for every fixed p−i such that (pi, p−i) ∈ S. Then there exists an equilibrium point
p∗ = (p1∗, p2∗, . . . , pM∗) ∈ S. That is,
f i(pi∗, p−i∗) = max
pi
{ f i(pi, p−i∗) | (pi, p−i∗) ∈ S },
for each i = 1, . . . ,M .
Based on this theorem, we have the following existence result for our pricing
game.
Theorem 4.2. Let S ⊆ RN be a closed and convex set such that S ∩Ω 6= ∅, TS ∩Ω
is lower semicontinuous and Gi(p
−i) in the game (3.3) are the marginal feasible
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regions of S. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied, Ω is bounded1 and convex,
and for each i = 1, . . . ,M , we have the following conditions:
(i) f i is a continuous function of p ∈ RN , and f i(pi, p−i) is concave in pi for
every fixed p−i such that (pi, p−i) ∈ S ∩ Ω;
(ii) f i(pi, p−i) ≤ f i(pi, p˜−i), di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(pi, p˜−i) for any (pi, p−i), (pi, p˜−i) ∈ Ω
with p−i ≤ p˜−i;
(iii) for any p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN+ , pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i).
Then there exists a GNE for the game (3.3).
Proof. By Ponstein (1966) (i.e., the previous theorem), given the conditions on
f i, S, TS ∩Ω, Ω in this theorem, and due to the closed property of Ω, there exists
a solution to the game (3.9). According to Theorem 3.6, this GNE is also a GNE
of the game (3.3).







s.t. 0 ≤ qi ≤ di(x)




is a frequently adopted pricing model. Now we apply Theorem 4.2 to it, leading
us to the following existence theorem.
1This condition can be easily satisfied, e.g., see Lemma 2.7.
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Theorem 4.3. Let S ⊆ RN be a closed and convex set such that S ∩Ω 6= ∅, TS ∩Ω
is lower semicontinuous and Gi(p
−i) in the game (3.4) are the marginal feasible
regions of S. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied, Ω is bounded and convex, and
for all i = 1, . . . ,M , the following conditions hold:
(i) di is a continuous function of p ∈ RN , di(·, p−i) is concave and monotonically
decreasing;
(ii) di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(pi, p˜−i) for any (pi, p−i), (pi, p˜−i) ∈ Ω with p−i ≤ p˜−i;
(iii) for any p = (pi, p−i) ∈ RN+ , pi ∈ Gi(p−i) implies Bi(p) ∈ Gi(p−i);
(iv) Qi = R
Ni and ci(q
i) = 0 or Qi = {qi ∈ R | qi ≤ Ci }, ci(qi) = kiqi for some
constants Ci, ki ≥ 0, and pi ≥ ki for all pi satisfying (pi, p−i) ∈ S ∩ Ω.
Then a GNE for the game (3.6) exists.
Proof. First, we note that by Proposition 3.2, condition (i) implies that f i(p)
defined in relation (3.5) satisfies f i(pi, p−i) ≤ f i(pi, p˜−i), for any (pi, p−i), (pi, p˜−i) ∈
Ω with p−i ≤ p˜−i.
Suppose that Qi = R
Ni and ci(q
i) = 0. It is easy to see that qi = di(p)
at optimality for the problem described in (3.5), given any p. Thus f i(p) =
pi
T
di(p). Given that di is continuous, it is clear that f i is a continuous func-
tion of p ∈ RN . Now for fixed p−i, the concavity of di(·, p−i) implies that given
any p˜i, there exists an η(p˜i) ∈ RNi×Ni (a subgradient of di at p˜i) such that
di(pi, p−i) ≤ di(p˜i, p−i) + η(p˜i)(pi − p˜i) ∀ pi. Also, the monotonicity of di(·, p−i)
means that (pi − p˜i)T (di(pi, p−i) − di(p˜i, p−i)) ≤ 0 ∀ pi. Thus we have, given any




di(pi, p−i)− p˜iT di(p˜i, p−i)
= (pi − p˜i)Tdi(pi, p−i) + p˜i T (di(pi, p−i)− di(p˜i, p−i))
≤ (pi − p˜i)T (di(pi, p−i)− di(p˜i, p−i)) + p˜iT η(p˜i)(pi − p˜i) + di(p˜i, p−i)T (pi − p˜i)
≤ [η(p˜i)T p˜i + di(p˜i, p−i)]T (pi − p˜i)
for all pi. This shows that the function pi
T
di(pi, p−i) of pi is concave. That is,
f i(pi, p−i) is concave in pi, for every fixed p−i such that (pi, p−i) ∈ S ∩ Ω. Thus
the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied and there exists a GNE for the game
(3.6).
Now we consider the case where Qi = {qi ∈ R | qi ≤ C i } and ci(qi) = kiqi.
We can see that since pi ≥ ki and qi ≤ di(p), we have qi = min {Ci, di(p)} at
optimality for the problem described in (3.5), given any p ∈ S ∩ Ω. Thus f i(p) =
(pi−ki)min {Ci, di(p)} for all p ∈ S ∩ Ω. Given that di is continuous, we have the
continuity of f i on S ∩ Ω. Note that f i can easily be extended to be continuous on




(pi, p−i) = min {Ci, di(pi, p−i)}. By condition (i) of this theorem, di(·, p−i)
is concave. Since the minimum of two concave functions is concave, the function
di
′
(·, p−i) is also concave. This means that given any p˜i, there exists a ς(p˜i) ∈ R
(the subgradient of di
′
at p˜i) such that di
′
(pi, p−i) ≤ di ′(p˜i, p−i)+ς(p˜i)(pi− p˜i) ∀ pi.
Also, it is clear that di(·, p−i) being monotonically decreasing implies that di ′(·, p−i)
is also monotonically decreasing. That is, (pi − p˜i)(di ′(pi, p−i)− di ′(p˜i, p−i)) ≤ 0 ∀
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pi. Hence, similarly to the above, we have for any p˜i,
(pi − ki)di ′(pi, p−i)− (p˜i − ki)di ′(p˜i, p−i)
= ((pi − ki)− (p˜i − ki))di ′(pi, p−i) + (p˜i − ki)(di ′(pi, p−i)− di ′(p˜i, p−i))
≤ (pi − p˜i)(di ′(pi, p−i)− di ′(p˜i, p−i)) + (p˜i − ki) ς(p˜i)(pi − p˜i) + di ′(p˜i, p−i)(pi − p˜i)
≤ [(p˜i − ki) ς(p˜i) + di ′(p˜i, p−i)](pi − p˜i)
for all pi. That is, f i(pi, p−i) = (pi − ki)di ′(pi, p−i) is a concave function of pi, and
is thus clearly concave in pi, for every fixed p−i such that (pi, p−i) ∈ S ∩ Ω. This
implies that the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied and there exists a GNE
for the game (3.6).
Although the existence proofs of equilibrium prices for the pricing games (3.3)
and (3.6) are merely simple consequences of Theorem 3.6 and a classical existence
result like Theorem 4.1, the result itself is nevertheless significant.
Note that our intention in this subsection is to demonstrate the significance of
results like Theorem 3.6. Thus for simplicity of exposition, we only consider some
special cases of the game (3.6) here. However, one can consider pricing games that
are more general, and apply known existence results other than Theorem 4.1.
4.2 The Irreducible Games
In many cases, we may not be able to simplify the original NCP-constrained game
(3.3) to the game (3.9). Thus we wish to study the conditions under which an NE
existence can be shown, for some special forms of the game (3.6). We will first
discuss the case where a single product is offered by each player in the game, and
then we go on to investigate the case where multiple products may be offered by
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each seller. Note that though the first situation is a special example of the latter
case, the NE existence result for the former case may be obtained under weaker
conditions.
4.2.1 Single-Product-Per-Player Case
We will consider the following problem setting. Suppose that each of the N players
offers one product in the market and the products are mutually substitutable. For
each seller i, we assume that marginal costs are negligible, i.e., ci(q) = 0; the
constraint qi ∈ Qi is absent; and the set of additional constraints on his product’s
price does not depend on p−i, thus we can write Gi(p−i) as Gi. For convenience,
we suppose that Gi ⊆ R+. It is easy to see that qi = di(B(p)) = Di(pi, p−i) at
optimality. In this case, with p¯−i fixed, we can rewrite (3.6) as
max
pi
f i(pi, p¯−i) = pi
T
Di(pi, p¯−i)
s.t. pi ∈ Gi (4.1)
For simplicity, we assume the use of the commonly used linear demand function
d(p) = b− Ap. This means that Di(pi, p¯−i) = (b− A(B(pi, p¯−i)))i above.
To show NE existence, we shall employ the celebrated Kakutani’s Fixed Point
Theorem. The main idea is to show that the function f i(pi, ·) is concave over a
certain interval.
First, we need the following results.
Lemma 4.4. Consider any function g(t) and let f(t) = tg(t) for t ∈ [0,∞). If g
is non-increasing and concave on [0,∞), then f is concave on [0,∞).
Proof. For any t0 > 0, let ξ ≤ 0 be a subgradient of g at t0. Then for any t ≥ 0,
g(t) ≤ g(t0) + ξ(t− t0).
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Thus,
f(t) = f(t0) + t(g(t)− g(t0)) + (t− t0)g(t0)
≤ f(t0) + tξ(t− t0) + (t− t0)g(t0)
= f(t0) + (tξ + g(t0))(t− t0)
≤ f(t0) + (t0ξ + g(t0))(t− t0)




 is a nonsingular M-matrix, where H is a square
matrix, t is a column vector, s is a row vector, and r is a number. Then for











Proof. One can verify the following identity H t
s r
−1 =
 H−1 + ρH−1tsH−1 −ρH−1t
−ρsH−1 ρ
 ,
where ρ = 1/(r − sH−1t). Thus





 = xH−1y+ρ (xH−1tsH−1y−x0sH−1y−xH−1ty0+x0y0).
By our hypothesis on
 H t
s r
, we have t, s ≤ 0, ρ > 0 and H is also an M-
matrix, i.e., H−1 ≥ 0. Hence ρ (xH−1tsH−1y − x0sH−1y − xH−1ty0 + x0y0) is the
sum of nonnegative terms and we are done.
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Now we are ready to show that f i is concave of pi over a certain interval.
Theorem 4.6. For each player i, given p¯−i fixed, if d is linear, A is a P-matrix,
and all the products are mutually substitutable, then there exists a constant hi such
that f i(pi, p¯−i) = piDi(pi, p¯−i) is concave over pi ∈ [0, hi).
Proof. As discussed before, since A is a P matrix and all the off-diagonal entries
of A are non-positive (because the products are mutually substitutable), A is a
nonsingular M-matrix and the inverses of A and all its principal submatrices are
nonnegative. Hence the condition (2.2) is satisfied and the demand for seller i’s
product, Di(pi) := Di(pi, p¯−i) = di(B(pi, p¯−i)) is non-increasing in pi by Theorem
2.11.
This means that there exists a constant hi such that d
i(B(pi, p¯−i)) > 0 for all
pi < hi and d
i(B(pi, p¯−i)) = 0 for all pi ≥ hi. Due to lemma 4.4, we need only to
show that Di(pi) is concave for pi ∈ [0, hi).
Let v ∈ (0, hi). Since Di(pi) is piecewise linear, there exists v1 < v < v2 such
that Di(pi) is linear on [v1, v] and [v, v2], respectively. Denote by ζ− and ζ+ the
derivative of Di in (v1, v) and (v, v2) respectively. We want to show ζ− ≥ ζ+.
Denote J := {j | dj(B(pi, p¯−i)) = 0, pi ∈ (v1, v)} and K := {k | dk(B(pi, p¯−i)) =
0, pi ∈ (v, v2)}. Also, let J˜ = {1, ..., N} \ J ∪ {i} and K˜ = {1, ..., N} \K ∪ {i}.
For our convenience, since p¯−i is fixed, we will just write B as a function of pi.
Because bK − AKipi − AKKBK(pi)− AKK˜BK˜(pi) = 0 and BK˜(pi) = p¯K˜ , we have
BK(p
i) = A−1KK(bK − AKipi − AKK˜ p¯K˜).
Now at each pi ∈ (v, v2), p¯K ≥ BK(pi). Note that since A is an M-matrix, all
the entries of A−1KKAKi are non-positive, that is, BK(p
i) is non-increasing as pi
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decreases. Thus p¯K ≥ BK(pi′) remains for all pi′ < pi. If p¯k > Bk(pi′), we have
dk(B(p
i′)) = 0. If p¯k = Bk(p
i′), since Akl ≤ 0 ∀ l 6= k and B−k(pi′) ≤ B−k(pi),
dk(B(p
i′)) cannot be higher than dk(B(p
i)), i.e., dk(B(p
i′)) = 0 remains.
Therefore, we have
K ⊆ J.
Now, for pi ∈ (v, v2), we can express






ζ− = AiJA−1JJAJi − Aii.
Now we wish to show that
AiJA
−1
JJAJi ≥ AiKA−1KKAKi (4.2)
Let P be the permutation matrix such that PAJJP = ÂJJ , where the first K rows
and columns of ÂJJ is AKK . Then
AiJA
−1
JJAJi = AiJP (PAJJP )
−1 PAJi = (AiJP ) Â−1JJ (PAJi),
where the firstK columns and rows of AiJP and PAJi areAiK andAKi respectively.
Using Lemma 4.5 repeatedly (i.e., by an induction argument), we obtain
(AiJP ) Â
−1
JJ (PAJi) ≥ AiKA−1KKAKi.
This means that
ζ− ≥ ζ+.
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We have thus shown that Di is concave and in turn, f i(pi, ·) is concave over [0, hi).
Before we discuss how the above result leads to NE existence based on Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem, we need some definitions. Similar to that in section 4.1, we
denote S as the joint feasible region of the players in a game, and let the map TS
be such that ∀ p¯ ∈ S, TS(p¯) = { p | p ∈ S, (pi, p¯−i) ∈ S, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N }. Note that





In addition, we now define r(p¯, p) =
N∑
i
f i(pi, p¯−i) and Ψ(p¯) = {y | y ∈ TS(p¯), r(p¯, y)
= max
p∈TS(p¯)
r(p¯, p)}. The Kakutani’s fixed point theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.7. (Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem:) Let Ψ : S → S be an upper
semi-continuous correspondence from a non-empty, compact, convex set S ⊂ RN
into itself such that for all p ∈ S, the set Ψ(p) is convex and non-empty. Then
Ψ(.) has a fixed point, i.e., there is a p∗ ∈ S where p∗ ∈ Ψ(p∗).
To prove NE existence, we will show that the set Ψ(p¯) is convex and non-empty
for all p¯ ∈ S, due to the concavity of f i(pi, ·) over [0, hi).
Theorem 4.8. If for each player i, Gi is a non-empty and compact interval, d
is linear and A is a P-matrix, then the set Ψ(p¯) is convex and non-empty for all
p¯ ∈ S.
Proof. For each player i, given p¯−i fixed, suppose that pˆi and p˜i are the maximizers
of f i(pi) := f i(pi, p¯−i) = piDi(pi, p¯−i) in Gi. The existence of maximizers is due to
the continuity of f i(pi) and the assumption on Gi (by Weierstrass Theorem). Then
we wish to show that pλ := λpˆi + (1 − λ)p˜i, for all λ ∈ [0, 1], are also maximizers
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of f i in Gi. That is, the set of maximizers of f
i in Gi is convex. Note that since
Gi is convex, p
λ ∈ Gi for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
First, suppose that f i(pˆi) = f i(p˜i) > 0. That is, pˆi, p˜i ∈ (0, hi). Then since f i
is concave over (0, hi) by Theorem 4.6, we have f
i(pλ) ≥ λf i(pˆi) + (1− λ)f i(p˜i) =
f i(p˜i). With f i(pλ) ≤ f i(p˜i), it is clear that pλ is a maximizer of f i in Gi, for each
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Now if f i(pˆi) = f i(p˜i) = 0, then either pˆi = p˜i = 0 or pˆi, p˜i ∈ [hi,∞)∩Gi
(Note that we can’t have pˆi = 0 and p˜i 6= 0, since Gi is convex, and pˆi, p˜i are
maximizers). In the first case, it is apparent that f i(pλ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. In
the latter case, we have pλ ∈ [hi,∞) ∩ Gi. Thus f i(pλ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. We
have shown that the set of maximizers of f i in Gi is convex.
Since each Gi is independent of p
−i, we have TS(p¯) = S; and the set of maximizers
of r(p¯, p) =
∑
i
f i(pi, p¯−i) over TS(p¯), Ψ(p¯), is simply the cartesian product of the
sets of maximizers of f i(pi, p¯−i) in Gi. Thus, Ψ(p¯) is convex and non-empty.
Theorem 4.9. Suppose that each of the N sellers in a market offer one product
each; the products are mutually substitutable; for each i = 1, . . . , N , Gi is a non-
empty and compact interval; the demand function d is linear and A is a P-matrix.
Then there exists a Nash Equilibrium for the game (4.1).
Proof. Under the assumption that Gi is a non-empty and compact interval, S is a
non-empty, compact and convex polyhedron. Since S is a convex polyhedron, the
point to set mapping TS is lower semicontinuous (by Lemma 2 of Ponstein [74]).
This implies that the mapping Ψ : S → S is upper semicontinuous (see Lemma 6
of [74]).
It follows that all the conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are satisfied
by our mapping Ψ. Hence, there exists a p∗ such that p∗ ∈ Ψ(p∗). That is,
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∑
i
f i(pi∗, p−i∗) ≥
∑
i
f i(pi, p−i∗) for all p ∈ TS(p∗) = S. This translates to saying
that for each player i, f i(pi∗, p−i∗) ≥ f i(pi, p−i∗) for all pi ∈ Gi and thus p∗ is a
Nash Equilibrium.
4.2.2 Multiple-Product-Per-Player Case
In this subsection, we consider a problem setting similar to that in the single-
product-per-player case. That is, for each seller i (i = 1, . . . ,M), we assume that
ci(q) = 0; the constraint q
i ∈ Qi is absent; and the set of additional constraints on
his product’s price does not depend on p−i. Similarly, we assume that Gi ⊆ RNi+
for convenience. However, in this case, we allow for the situation where each seller
can offer multiple products in the market and the products may not be mutually
substitutable. Here we consider the following pricing model as in the subsection
4.2.1, given p¯−i fixed.
max
pi
f i(pi, p¯−i) = pi
T
Di(pi, p¯−i)
s.t. pi ∈ Gi (4.3)
We will once again make use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to prove NE
existence for the above game. Similarly to the proof for the single-product-per-
player case, we need to show that the set of optimal solutions to the problem (4.3)
is convex. As the function f i is not concave, we shall consider an ‘equivalent’
but more tractable problem instead. To do this, we first define Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) =
{ xi | (xi, x−i) = B(pi, p¯−i), pi ∈ Gi}.
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s.t. x−i = B−i(xi, p¯−i) (4.4)
xi ∈ Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}).
Theorem 4.10. Under Assumption 1, the problems (4.3) and (4.4) are ‘equivalent’
in the sense that
(i) they have the same objective values;
(ii) if pi∗ is optimal to (4.3), then B(pi∗, p¯−i) is optimal to (4.4);
(iii) if x∗ is optimal to (4.4), then any pi ∈ Gi such that B(pi, p¯−i) = x∗ is optimal
to (4.3).
Proof. Suppose pi∗ is optimal to problem (4.3) with optimal objective value z1,
and x∗ is optimal to (4.4) with optimal objective value z2.
The feasibility of x∗ to (4.4) implies that x−i∗ = B−i(xi∗, p¯−i), and ∃ pˆi ∈ Gi and
xˆ−i such that (xi∗, xˆ−i) = B(pˆi, p¯−i). That is,
0 ≤ d(xi∗, xˆ−i) ⊥ (pˆi, p¯−i)− (xi∗, xˆ−i) ≥ 0. (4.5)
It is clear that if we replace pˆi by xi∗ in (4.5), the complementarity conditions
will still be satisfied by (xi∗, xˆ−i). That is, (xi∗, xˆ−i) = B(xi∗, p¯−i). Since we
assume that the solution to NCP(p) is unique ∀ p, we must have xˆ−i = x−i∗.
Thus, (xi∗, x−i∗) = B(pˆi, p¯−i). As discussed in the proof of Proposition 3.2,
B(p)Td(B(p)) = pTd(B(p) always holds. So with pˆi feasible to (4.3), we have
z2 = x
i∗ Tdi(xi∗, x−i∗) = pˆi
T
Di(pˆi, p¯−i) ≤ z1. (4.6)
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On the other hand, the optimal solution to (4.3), pi∗ ∈ Gi. Let x˜ = B(pi∗, p¯−i)).
It is clear that x˜i ∈ Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) and
0 ≤ d(x˜i, x˜−i) ⊥ (pi∗, p¯−i)− (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ 0. (4.7)
Again, if pi∗ is replaced by x˜i in (4.7), we see that the complementarity conditions
still hold. That is, x˜−i = B−i(x˜i, p¯−i). Thus, x˜ is feasible to (4.4) and with
B(p)Td(B(p)) = pTd(B(p),
z1 = p
i∗ TDi(pi∗, p¯−i)) = x˜i
T
di(x˜i, x˜−i) ≤ z2. (4.8)
From (4.6) and (4.8), we obtain z1 = z2 and (i) is proven. In addition, with z2 = z1
in (4.6), we see that any pi ∈ Gi satisfying B(pi, p¯−i) = x∗ is optimal to (4.3).
From (4.8), with z1 = z2, we have the optimality of B(p
i∗, p¯−i)) to (4.4). Hence
(ii) and (iii) are proven.
Using the above ‘equivalence’, we will go on to show that the optimal solution
to the problem (4.4) is unique, and then the convexity of the optimal solution set
of problem (4.3) will follow. However, we first need the following result.
Lemma 4.11. Let Ωi(p¯
−i) := { xi | d(xi, x−i) ≥ 0, d−i(xi, x−i) ⊥ p¯−i − x−i ≥ 0 }.
Then
(i) Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) ⊆ Ωi(p¯−i);
(ii) xi = Bi(xi, p¯−i), ∀ xi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i).
Proof. (i) Suppose xˆi ∈ Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}). That is, ∃ xˆ−i such that (xˆi, xˆ−i) =
B(pi, p¯−i), for some pˆi ∈ Gi. This is equivalent to saying that
0 ≤ d(xˆi, xˆ−i) ⊥ (pˆi, p¯−i)− (xˆi, xˆ−i) ≥ 0. (4.9)
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Since the constraints defining Ωi(p¯
−i) form a subset of the constraints defining xˆi
in (4.9), we have xˆi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i).
(ii) Let x˜i ∈ Ωi(p¯−i). Then ∃ x˜−i such that d(x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ 0 and d−i(x˜i, x˜−i) ⊥
p¯−i− x˜−i ≥ 0. It is clear that 0 ≤ di(x˜i, x˜−i) ⊥ x˜i− x˜i ≥ 0 holds. Hence, we have
0 ≤ d(x˜i, x˜−i) ⊥ (x˜i, p¯−i)− (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ 0.
This implies that x˜i = Bi(x˜i, p¯−i).
To prove the uniqueness of the optimal solution of problem (4.4), we need to
show that the objective function in (4.4) is strictly concave over the set Ωi(p¯
−i).
Theorem 4.12. Under Assumption 1, suppose that di is strictly concave and d
is monotonically decreasing; or that di is concave and d is strictly monotonically
decreasing; and the negative of the Jacobian of di at any point is an M-matrix2.
Then f i
′
is strictly concave over Ωi(p¯
−i).
If in addition, the set Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) is convex, non-empty and compact, then
there is a unique solution x∗ to the problem (4.4).
Proof. We first prove that di(pi, B−i(pi, p¯−i)) is concave over Ωi(p¯−i).
For any pˆi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i), with J defined as the index set corresponding to player i’s
products (ie., pJ = p
i) and J¯ = {1, ..., N}\J , let Jˆ = {j ∈ J¯ | p¯j > Bj(pˆi, p¯−i)} and
J˜ = J¯ \ Jˆ . Then we have dJˆ(B(pˆi, p¯−i)) = 0 and BJ˜(pˆi, p¯−i) = p¯J˜ . For convenience,
since p¯−i is fixed, we redefine B(pi) := B(pi, p¯−i).
Suppose di is concave. That is, given any B(pˆi), ∃ ξ ∈ RJ×N such that
di(B(pi)) ≤ di(B(pˆi)) + ξ(B(pi)−B(pˆi)),
2If d is linear, A is a P-matrix, and all the products are assumed mutually substitutable, then
the negative of the Jacobian of di, i.e., A, is an M-matrix
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for all B(pi). Since di is smooth, the subgradient ξ is the Jacobian of di at B(pˆi).
Then ∀ pi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i), by Lemma 4.11 (ii), we have
di(pi, B−i(pi))− di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))
≤ ξJJ(pi − pˆi) + ξJJˆ(BJˆ(pi)−BJˆ(pˆi)) + ξJJ˜(BJ˜(pi)−BJ˜(pˆi)) (4.10)
≤ ξJJ(pi − pˆi) + ξJJˆ(BJˆ(pi)−BJˆ(pˆi)),
where the last inequality follows from the facts that ξJJ˜ ≥ 0 (under the assumption
that −ξ is an M-matrix) and BJ˜(pi)−BJ˜(pˆi) ≤ 0 (since BJ˜(pˆi) = p¯J˜).
In addition,
0 ≤ dJˆ(pi, B−i(pi))− dJˆ(pˆi, B−i(pˆi)) (4.11)
≤ ξJˆJ(pi − pˆi) + ξJˆ Jˆ(BJˆ(pi)−BJˆ(pˆi)) + ξJˆ J˜(BJ˜(pi)−BJ˜(pˆi))
≤ ξJˆJ(pi − pˆi) + ξJˆ Jˆ(BJˆ(pi)−BJˆ(pˆi)),
where the inequality (4.11) is due to dJˆ(pˆ
i, B−i(pˆi)) = 0, and the last inequality
follows from the same reasoning as above. This implies that BJˆ(p
i) − BJˆ(pˆi) ≤
(−ξJˆ Jˆ)−1ξJˆJ(pi− pˆi) (because (−ξJˆ Jˆ)−1 ≥ 0 given that −ξ is an M-matrix). There-
fore, at any given pˆi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i),
di(pi, B−i(pi))− di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi)) ≤ (ξJJ + ξJJˆ(−ξJˆ Jˆ)−1ξJˆJ)(pi − pˆi),
∀ pi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i). This means that, with η = (ξJJ + ξJJˆ(−ξJˆ Jˆ)−1ξJˆJ) as the subgra-
dient of di(pi, B−i(pi)) at pˆi, the function di(pi, B−i(pi)) is concave over Ωi(p¯−i).
Note that in Ωi(p¯
−i), the objective function xi Tdi(x) can be written as
pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi)), since pi = Bi(pi, p¯−i). Therefore, we now need to prove that
pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi)) is strictly concave over Ωi(p¯−i). But we need the following lemma
for our purpose.
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Lemma 4.13. Suppose that d is monotonically decreasing on RN+ and Assump-
tion 1 is satisfied. Then given p¯−i, di(pi, B−i(pi)) is monotonically decreasing on
Ωi(p¯
−i). That is,
(pi − pˆi)T (di(pi, B−i(pi))− di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))) ≤ 0, ∀ pi, pˆi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i).
Proof. By Theorem 2.15, if d is monotonically decreasing on RN+ , then (p −
pˆ)T (D(p) − D(pˆ)) ≤ 0, ∀ p, pˆ ∈ RN+ . Let pi, pˆi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i). Consider p = (pi, p¯−i)
and pˆ = (pˆi, p¯−i), then Di(p) = di(B(pi, p¯−i)) = di(pi, B−i(pi)) and Di(pˆ) =
di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi)). Thus we have (pi − pˆi)T (di(pi, B−i(pi)) − di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))) = (p −
pˆ)T (D(p)−D(pˆ)) ≤ 0.
Now at any given pˆi ∈ Ωi, we obtain
pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi))− pˆiT di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))
= (pi − pˆi)Tdi(pi, B−i(pi)) + pˆi T (di(pi, B−i(pi))− di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi)))
≤ (pi − pˆi)T (di(pi, B−i(pi))− di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))) + pˆiT η(pi − pˆi) (4.12)
+di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))T (pi − pˆi)
≤ [ηT pˆi + di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))]T (pi − pˆi) (4.13)
for all pi ∈ Ωi(p¯−i).
Note that the last inequality (4.13) is due to the fact that di(pi, B−i(pi)) is
monotonically decreasing on Ωi(p¯
−i), which follows from Lemma 4.13. At this
point, we have shown that pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi)) is concave on Ωi(p¯−i). However, we
can observe that if in addition, di is strictly concave (i.e., the inequality (4.12)
becomes strict); or that d is strictly monotonically decreasing (i.e., the inequality
(4.13) becomes strict), we will have
pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi))− pˆiT di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi)) < [ηT pˆi + di(pˆi, B−i(pˆi))]T (pi − pˆi).
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That is, the function pi
T
di(pi, B−i(pi)) is strictly concave on Ωi(p¯−i).
Since f i
′
is strictly concave over Ωi(p¯
−i), Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) ⊆ Ωi(p¯−i) (by Lemma
4.11 (i)), and Bi(Gi×{p¯−i}) is assumed convex, non-empty and compact, there is
a unique optimal solution x∗ to problem (4.4).
By Theorem 4.10 (iii), G∗i := { pi ∈ Gi |B(pi, p¯−i) = x∗ } is the set of maximizers
of f i(pi, p¯−i) over Gi in problem (4.3). Therefore, our final step is to show that G∗i
is convex and non-empty.
Lemma 4.14. Suppose that under Assumption 1, for each i = 1, . . . ,M ,
(i) Gi is convex, non-empty and compact;
(ii) Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) is convex;
(iii) either di is strictly concave and d is monotonically decreasing; or that di is
concave and d is strictly monotonically decreasing;
(iv) the negative of the Jacobian of di at any point is an M-matrix.
Then G∗i is convex and non-empty.
Proof.We first show that given any x ∈ RN+ , the set Si(x) := { pi ∈ RNi |B(pi, p¯−i) =
x } is convex.
If Si(x) = ∅, it is trivial that Si(x) is convex. So we suppose Si(x) 6= ∅. Let
p˜i, pˆi ∈ Si(x). That is, B(p˜i, p¯−i) = B(pˆi, p¯−i) = x. We will prove that for all
λ ∈ [0, 1], pi(λ) = λp˜i+(1−λ)pˆi lies in Si(x). Given a λ ∈ [0, 1], with (p˜i, p¯−i) ≥ x
and (pˆi, p¯−i) ≥ x, it is clear that (pi(λ), p¯−i) ≥ x. By our definition of x, we
have d(x) ≥ 0. Thus it remains to prove that d(x) ⊥ ((pi(λ), p¯−i) − x). Suppose
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(pi(λ), p¯−i)j > xj, then at least (p˜i, p¯−i)j > xj or (pˆi, p¯−i)j > xj. This implies that
dj(x) = 0. Now suppose that dj(x) > 0, then (p˜
i, p¯−i)j = (pˆi, p¯−i)j = xj and we
have (pi(λ), p¯−i)j = xj. Hence, B(pi(λ), p¯−i) = x for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and Si(x) is
convex.
Observe that Gi 6= ∅ and compact ⇒ Bi(Gi×{p¯−i}) 6= ∅ and compact, thus the
unique solution x∗ exists. Since G∗i = Gi ∩ { pi ∈ RNi |B(pi, p¯−i) = x∗ }, Gi and
Si(x
∗) are convex and non-empty, we have the convexity of G∗i and G
∗
i 6= ∅.
With the above results, we will show the existence of a NE using a similar idea
to that in the previous section. Hence, we denote the set S, the function r, and
the mappings TS and Ψ as before.
Theorem 4.15. Consider that there are M sellers in the market, where each seller
can offer multiple products. Let the mapping Ψ : S → S be upper semi-continuous.
Under Assumption 1, suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each
seller i = 1, . . . ,M .
(i) Gi is non-empty, convex and compact;
(ii) Bi(Gi × {p¯−i}) is convex;
(iii) either di is strictly concave and d is monotonically decreasing; or that di is
concave and d is strictly monotonically decreasing;
(iv) the negative of the Jacobian of di at any point is an M-matrix.
Then there exists a NE for the game (4.3).
Proof. The explanations here are similar to that in the subsection 4.2.1. By
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condition (i), S =
N∏
i=1
Gi is non-empty, convex and compact. Once again, since
each Gi is independent of p
−i, given p¯ ∈ S, TS(p¯) = S, and Ψ(p¯) is simply the
cartesian product of the sets of maximizers of f i(pi, p¯−i) in Gi, i.e., G∗i . Thus, by
Lemma 4.14, Ψ(p¯) is convex and non-empty.
It follows that all the conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are satisfied
by our mapping Ψ and a Nash Equilibrium exists (by the same reasoning used in
the proof of Theorem 4.9).
Note that if S is a convex polyhedron (e.g., if each Gi is a polyhedral set), then
Ψ : S → S is upper semicontinuous since TS is lower semicontinuous, by Lemmas
2 and 6 of Ponstein [74], as we have discussed before.
4.3 The Random Case
In Section 3.3, we presented a random demand pricing model by introducing
stochasticity into the NCP-constrained pricing model. When a game involves these
stochastic MPECs as best response problems, it becomes a Stochastic EPEC.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no known results on NE existence for
general stochastic EPEC. This problem has only very recently been discussed in the
literature (see Yao, Oren and Adler [98] and [99] for the application of stochastic
EPEC to electricity markets).
As we have previously discussed, it is difficult to ensure the existence of NE
for EPEC; still more difficult is the issue of NE existence for Stochastic EPEC.
Extensive trials using more complicated methods for more complex forms of the
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model (3.16) led us to highly involved results which were not very informative.
Thus in this section, we will only study a simple random demand pricing game.
Consider a set of 2 mutually substitutable products, each of which is offered by
one player (i.e., we have a two-player game). The set of additional constraints on
each product’s price is assumed independent of the other product’s price, hence we
write Gi(p
−i) = Gi. As before, for convenience, Gi ⊆ RNi+ is assumed. Since each
of the two players offer one product only, we can write pi as pi, d
i as di and so on,
for clarity of presentation.
Then if the demand is associated with a continuous random variable ω ∈ Ω with











s.t. 0 ≤ d(x(ω), ω) ⊥ p− x(ω) ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω (4.14)
pi ∈ Gi.
We will prove NE existence for the game (4.14) for linear d. That is, here






 p. Since the products are mutually
substitutable, we can assume that a12, a21 < 0 for simplicity. Also, we suppose
that A is a P-matrix in this section, i.e., Assumption 1 is satisfied.
In this game, we will only use the Gamma distribution as it is sufficiently general
for our purpose. Given the shape parameter α and the rate parameter β, the
probability density function of the gamma distribution can be expressed as Υ(ω) =
ωα−1βαe−βω
Γ(α)
, ω > 0, where the gamma function Γ(α) = (α−1)!. For the simplicity
of exposition, we will use the parameters α = 2 and β = 1. Thus, the probability
density function
Υ(ω) = ωe−ω, ∀ω > 0,
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x(ω), ∀ω > 0,
with x(ω) satisfying 0 ≤ d(x(ω), ω) ⊥ p − x(ω) ≥ 0. We can observe that, in the
above expression, the randomness of demand is reflected through the uncertainty in
the sensitivity parameters defining demand; and the demand for different products
are correlated (since all the sensitivity parameters are affected by ω in the same
way).
We will employ the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem yet again for our purpose.
Hence as before, we need to prove that the set of maximizers for each player’s
best response problem is convex. For simplicity, we will just prove that the set of
maximizers for player 1’s problem is convex. It is clear that the proof is similar for
player 2’s problem.
For player 1, given p¯2 fixed, since d1(x(ω), ω) = 0 whenever p1 > x1(ω) for some
ω > 0, i.e., it does not contribute to the objective function value, it is sufficient to
consider the ranges of p1 and ω such that d1(p1, x2(ω), ω) ≥ 0. That is, x1(ω) = p1.
On the other hand, we also need to consider the ranges of p1 and ω corresponding
to the cases when x2(ω) = p¯2 and when x2(ω) < p¯2.
Thus we will discuss the following cases.
Case 1: x2(ω) = p¯2.
We require
d1(p1, p¯2, ω) = b1 − 1
ω
(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0
d2(p1, p¯2, ω) = b2 − 1
ω
(a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≥ 0
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Subcase (a): −(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0 & − (a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≥ 0.









since det(A) = a11a22 − a12a21 > 0 (given that A is a P-matrix), and
a11 > 0, a21 < 0. Thus for this subcase, d1, d2 ≥ 0 only if p1 = p¯2 = 0.
Note that the this case does not contribute to the objective function
value of the problem (4.14).
Subcase (b): −(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0 & − (a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≤ 0.
This translates to p1 ≤ s and p1 ≤ t.
To satisfy d1(p1, p¯2, ω) = b1 − 1ω (a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0, if p1 ≤ s, i.e,
−(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0, the range of ω allowed is 0 < ω <∞.
To have d2(p1, p¯2, ω) = b2− 1ω (a21p1+a22p¯2) ≥ 0, if −(a21p1+a22p¯2) ≤ 0,
i.e., p1 ≤ t, the range of ω allowed is ω ≥ a21p1+a22p¯2b2 := φ(p1).
Hence for this subcase, d1, d2 ≥ 0 only if p1 ≤ min{s, t} = s and
ω ≥ φ(p1).
Subcase (c): −(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≤ 0 & − (a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≥ 0.
That is, p1 ≥ s and p1 ≥ t.
We can check that d1(p1, p¯2, ω) = b1 − 1ω (a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≥ 0 and p1 ≥ s,
corresponds to the range of ω ≥ a11p1+a12p¯2
b1
:= ϕ(p1).
Is is clear that to have d2(p1, p¯2, ω) = b2 − 1ω (a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≥ 0, given
that p1 ≥ t, we can have 0 < ω <∞.
So to satisfy d1, d2 ≥ 0, here we need p1 ≥ max{s, t} = t and ω ≥ ϕ(p1).
Subcase (d): −(a11p1 + a12p¯2) ≤ 0 & − (a21p1 + a22p¯2) ≤ 0.
This is equivalent to p1 ≥ s and p1 ≤ t.
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Again, we can see that if p1 ≥ s, then d1 ≥ 0 when ω ≥ ϕ(p1). In
addition, p1 ≤ t together with d2 ≥ 0 implies we must have ω ≥ φ(p1).
We can check that
ϕ(p1) ≥ φ(p1) ⇐⇒ a11p1 + a12p¯2
b1
≥ a21p1 + a22p¯2
b2
⇐⇒ p1 ≥ (a22b1 − a12b2)p¯2
a11b2 − a21b1 := k.
Also, it is not hard to see that
t− k = a22p¯2−a21 −
(a22b1 − a12b2)p¯2
a11b2 − a21b1 =
(a22a11 + a12a21)b2p¯2
−a21(a11b2 − a21b1) ≥ 0,
and
k − s = (a22b1 − a12b2)p¯2





a11(a11b2 − a21b1) ≥ 0.
Therefore, if s ≤ p1 ≤ k, then d1, d2 ≥ 0 corresponds to ω ≥ φ(p1); and
if k ≤ p1 ≤ t, then d1, d2 ≥ 0 when ω ≥ ϕ(p1).
Case 2: x2(ω) < p¯2.
This implies that
d2(p1, x2(ω), ω) = b2 − 1
ω
(a21p1 + a22x2(ω)) = 0,




In this case, we are interested in the ranges of p1 and ω such that










d2(p1, p¯2, ω) = b2 − 1
ω
(a21p1 + a22p¯2) < 0.
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Since det(A) > 0, we can see that d1(p1, x2(ω), ω) ≥ 0 as long as
ω ≥ a11a22 − a12a21
a22b1 − a12b2 p1 =
det(A)
a22b1 − a12b2 p1 := ψ(p1).
On the other hand, it is clear that d2(p1, p¯2, ω) < 0 if a21p1 + a22p¯2 > 0, i.e.,
p1 < t, and the corresponding range of ω is ω < φ(p1).
In order to have d1(p1, x2(ω), ω) ≥ 0 and d2(p1, p¯2, ω) < 0, we need φ(p1) >
ψ(p1). Observe that




a22b1 − a12b2 p1 ⇔ p1 <
a22b1 − a12b2
a11b2 − a21b1 p¯2.
Summarizing the above, to satisfy d1(p1, x2(ω), ω) ≥ 0 and d2(p1, p¯2, ω) < 0,
the allowable ranges of p1 and ω are p1 < min{t, k} = k (recall that k =
a22b1−a12b2
a11b2−a21b1 p¯2), and ψ(p1) ≤ ω < φ(p1).
We collate the above cases to determine the objective function Φ(pi) of the
problem (4.14), as follows.
From case 1(b), we have for p1 ≤ s, Φ(p1) = p1
∫ ∞
φ(p1)
d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω.
From case 1(c), we have for p1 ≥ t, Φ(p1) = p1
∫ ∞
ϕ(p1)
d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω.
From case 1(d), we have for s ≤ p1 ≤ k, Φ(p1) = p1
∫ ∞
φ(p1)
d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω,
and for k ≤ p1 ≤ t, Φ(p1) = p1
∫ ∞
ϕ(p1)
d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω.
Finally from case 2, for p1 < k, Φ(p1) = p1
∫ φ(p1)
ψ(p1)
d1(p1, x2(ω), ω)Υ(ω) dω.




d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω +
∫ φ(p1)
ψ(p1)
d1(p1, x2(ω), ω)Υ(ω) dω
}
,
4.3 The Random Case 109




d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω.
We will now simplify the function Φ(p1), over the different intervals of p1.
For 0 ≤ p1 < k, we have∫ ∞
φ(p1)
d1(p1, p¯2, ω)Υ(ω) dω +
∫ φ(p1)
ψ(p1)
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b1(ψ(p1) + 1) e




Now that we have found the explicit expression of the objective function Φ(p1),
we can go on to show that the set of maximizers of the problem (4.14) for player
1, is convex and non-empty.
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Lemma 4.16. If G1 is a non-empty and compact interval, then the set of maxi-
mizers of Φ(p1), as given in (4.16) and (4.17), over G1 is non-empty and convex.
Proof. We will first study the shape of the complicated function Φ(p1) in (4.16).



















(p1) = 0⇐⇒ −a12
a22





































































Given that b1, b2, a11, a22 > 0, det(A) > 0 and a12, a21 < 0, we can write the
above expression to be of the form
−k1 + k2
k3 p1 + k4
= ek5p1−k6 ,
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Figure 4.1: To check for the existence of critical points of Φ(p1) in [0, k]
where ki, i = 1, . . . , 6, are all positive constants. We plot the functions on both
sides of the equation using matlab. See Figure 4.1. Note that we denote g(p1) =
−k1 + k2k3 p1+k4 and h(p1) = ek5p1−k6 in the plot.
We observe from the figure that there is only one point where g(p1) = h(p1), that
is, the graph Φ(p1) only has one critical point, denoted as pc. However, depending
on the parameters defining A and the value of p¯2, the point pc may or may not be
inside the interval [0, k).
















In addition, since φ(k) = ψ(k) (recall the discussion for Case 2), we see that the
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left derivative of Φ at k is
Φ
′
−(k) = (b1 − a11k) e−φ(k) =
 > 0, if k < b1a11 ;≤ 0, if k ≥ b1
a11
.
We then analyze the property of the function Φ(p1) in (4.17). Here, Φ(p1) =
b1p1 e
−ψ(p1). The first derivative of Φ over (k,∞) is
Φ
′
(p1) = (b1 − a11p1) e−ψ(p1) =
 > 0, if p1 < b1a11 ;≤ 0, if p1 ≥ b1a11 .
From this expression, we can obtain Φ
′







Combining the above studies, we can conclude the following possible behaviours of
the function Φ(p1) over p1 ∈ [0,∞).
Case (I): k < b1
a11
.
Subcase (i): pc ∈ [0, k).
Since Φ
′
(0) > 0, Φ
′
(k) > 0 and pc is the only critical point of Φ in
[0, k), pc must be an inflection point. In addition, we saw that Φ
′
> 0 if
k ≤ p1 < b1a11 and Φ
′ ≤ 0 if p1 ≥ b1a11 . Thus in this subcase, p1 = b1a11 is a
local maximum of Φ, in the interval [k,∞).
To summarize, Φ increases from p1 = 0 to p1 =
b1
a11
, and then decreases
after that. See Figure 4.2 for an illustration.
Subcase (ii): pc 6∈ [0, k).
Similar to that in subcase (i), p1 =
b1
a11
is a local maximum of Φ in
[k,∞). It is clear that once again, Φ increases from p1 = 0 to p1 = b1a11 ,
and then it decreases henceforth.
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Figure 4.2: The Graph of Φ corresponding to the case I(i).
Case (II): k ≥ b1
a11
.
In this case, since Φ
′
(0) > 0 and Φ
′
(k) ≤ 0, we must have pc ∈ [0, k]. Together
with the fact that Φ
′
(p1) ≤ 0 for all p1 ≥ k, it is easy to see that, Φ must
increase from p1 = 0 to p1 = pc, and then decrease after that.
Since in all the above cases, Φ increases to some point and decreases from then
on, it is clear that maximizing Φ over a non-empty, compact interval G1, yields a
non-empty convex set of maximizers.
Theorem 4.17. Consider a two-player game where each player offers one product.
Assume that Gi (i = 1, 2) is a non-empty and compact interval; d is linear and
A is a P-matrix (with aii, bi > 0 and aij < 0, for j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2). In addition,
suppose that Υ(ω) is the probability density function of the gamma distribution,
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with the shape parameter α = 2 and the rate parameter β = 1. Then the game
(4.14) has a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. The argument is similar to that explained in the subsection 4.2.1, noting
that the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.16 can also be used to show that the
set of maximizers in player two’s best response problem is non-empty and convex.
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have introduced a new pricing model based on a demand sys-
tem defined via a complementarity problem. We explored some properties of our
demand and pricing models, and explained some associated difficulties. Under cer-
tain conditions, we have also shown that the complementarity constrained pricing
model can be simplified by eliminating the complementarity constraints. Such a
simplification may be possible for many other optimization problems and games
involving our model of demand functions. The theoretical analysis of the reduced
model is then greatly simplified.
However, we wish to emphasize that any simplification must be rigorously justi-
fied using a fundamental complete model. Our pricing model (3.3) gives a concrete
realization of this principle. On the other hand, there are also many instances
in which such simplifications can lead to wrong models, as shown by some of the
examples we have presented. In these situations, the NCP constraints inherited




For these cases where the complementarity constrained pricing model remains
necessary, inclusive of the case when random demand is considered, we have pre-
sented some conditions under which a Nash Equilibrium existence is still possible.
However, due to the complexity of these complementarity constrained problems, we
have not found additional sufficiently informative results to present here, despite
having investigated numerous other variations of our basic model. Thus, possible
future research directions include finding other ways to simplify our pricing mod-
els, and exploring more techniques to prove Nash Equilibrium existence for other
varied forms of our games.
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Appendix A
Program code to find Nash Equilibrium
for example 3.7
MAIN FUNCTION FILE: To find an equilibrium pricing policy (if there exists)
for the simplified game
[P,Q, Time, Step] = equilprice(Nm, A, b, E, f, F, h);
A = [2 0 3; 0 2 1; 0 1.5 1.5]; b = [20; 13; 10]; E = 0; f = 0;
F = zeros(1,3); h = 0; Nm = [2; 1]; c = [0 5 0];
t1 = cputime; n = length(Nm); N = sum(Nm);
p0 = zeros(N,1); p01 = zeros(N,1); pN = []; qN = [];
for t = 1:10000







[pk, qk] = maxrevk2(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p01, k, ck);
pN = [pN; pk];
qN = [qN; qk];
p01(K) = pk;
end
if norm(pN − p0, 2)/norm(p0, 2) < 10(−4)
break;
else
p0 = pN; q0 = qN; p01 = pN;
pN = []; qN = [];
end
end
Time = cputime - t1; P = pN; Q = qN;
FUNCTION FILE: To find the best response of player k, given other players’ prices
(for simplified game)
function [pk, qk] = maxrevk2(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, ck);
Nk = Nm(k); Sum = sum(Nm(1:k-1)); K = [Sum+1:Sum+Nk];
m = Nk + size(E,1) + size(F,1);
Aineq = zeros(m,2*Nk); Aineq(1:Nk, 1:Nk) = eye(Nk);
Aineq(1:Nk, Nk+1:2*Nk) = A(K,K);
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bineq = [b(K)- A(K,[1:Sum Sum+Nk+1:N])*[p0(1:Sum); p0(Sum+Nk+1:N)]; f;
h-F(:,[1:Sum Sum+Nk+1:N])*[p0(1:Sum); p0(Sum+Nk+1:N)]];
Aineq(Nk+1:Nk+size(E,1),1:Nk) = E;
Aineq(Nk+size(E,1)+1:m, Nk+1:2*Nk) = F(:,K);
LB = -1e-5*ones(2*Nk,1);
UB = 10000*ones(2*Nk,1);
x = zeros(2*Nk+1,1); E1 = ones(m, 1);
f1 = zeros(2*Nk+1,1); f1(2*Nk+1, 1) = -1;
AA = [Aineq E1]; bb = [bineq; 0];
AA = [AA; zeros(1, 2*Nk+1)]; AA(m+1, 2*Nk+1) = 1;
lb = [LB; 0]; ub = [UB; inf];
[x,fval,exitflag4] = linprog(f1, AA, bb, [], [], lb, ub); X0 = x(1:2*Nk,1);
[X,z,exitflag2]=fmincon(@obj2,X0,Aineq,bineq,[],[],LB,UB,[],[],Nk,Sum,ck);
if exitflag2 == 0
error(’fmincon max no. of iterations reached for BR prob of reduced model’);
end






Program codes for example 3.8
(corresponding to pricing model (3.6))
Main Function File: To find an equilibrium pricing policy (if there exists).
[This program is based on an adaptation of the generic branch-and-bound method ]
[P,Q, Time, Step] = equilprice(Nm, A, b, E, f, F, h);
A = [2 1; 1 2]; b = [10; 18]; E = 0; f = 0;
F = zeros(1,2); h = 0; Nm = [1; 1]; c = [10 5];
t1 = cputime; n = length(Nm); N = sum(Nm);
p0 = zeros(N,1); p01 = zeros(N,1); pN = []; qN = []; xN = [];
for t = 1:10000







[pk, qk, xk] = maxrevk(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p01, k, ck);
pN = [pN; pk];
qN = [qN; qk];
xN = [xN; xk];
p01(K) = pk;
end
if norm(pN − p0, 2)/norm(p0, 2) < 10−4
break;
else
p0 = pN; q0 = qN; p01 = pN; pN = []; qN = []; xN = [];
end
end
Time = cputime - t1; P = pN; Q = qN; X = xN;
return;
FUNCTION FILE: To find the best response of player k, given other players’ prices
function [pk, qk, xk] = maxrevk(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, ck);
LB = 0; S = zeros(1,N); Nk = Nm(k);
for j = 1:N
So = S;
Sj = [nchoosek(1:N,j) zeros(nchoosek(N,j), N-j)];
S = [So; Sj];
end
for t = 1:10000







[X,z0,exitflag] = maxrevI(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, Nk, I, ck);
for r = 1
if exitflag < 0|(z0− LB <= 1e− 4&LB = 0)
S(1,:) = [];
del = [];
for i = 1:size(S,1)
L = setdiff(I,S(i,:));
if length(L) == 0







J = find(b-A*x < 1e-4);
lJ = length(J);
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for i = 1:size(S,1)
fnz = find(S(i,:));









[XJ,zJ,exitflag2] = maxrevJ(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, Nk, J, ck);
check = 0;
if exitflag2 > 0











for i = 1:size(S,1)
L2 = setdiff(I,S(i,:));
if length(L2) == 0






if check == 1
break
end
for s = 1:size(S,1)
fnz2 = find(S(s,:));
nzS2 = S(s,fnz2);





if s > 1
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J = I;
[XI,zI,exitflag3] = maxrevJ(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, Nk, J, ck);
if exitflag3 > 0











FUNCTION FILE:: To solve the best response problem when we fix dI = 0 for
given I




m = Nk + N + length(Imin) + size(E,1) + size(F,1);
Aineq = zeros(m,2*Nk+N);
bineq = [b(K); b(Imin); p0(1:Sum); zeros(Nk,1); p0(Sum+Nk+1:N); f;
h-F(:,[1:Sum Sum+Nk+1:N])*[p0(1:Sum); p0(Sum+Nk+1:N)]];
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Aineq(1:Nk, 1:Nk) = eye(Nk);
Aineq(1:Nk, 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(K,:);
Aineq(Nk+1:Nk+length(Imin), 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(Imin,:);
Aineq(Nk+length(Imin)+1:Nk+length(Imin)+N,2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = eye(N);
Aineq(Nk+length(Imin)+Sum+1:2*Nk+length(Imin)+Sum, Nk+1:2*Nk) = -eye(Nk);
Aineq(N+Nk+length(Imin)+1:N+Nk+length(Imin)+size(E,1),1:Nk) = E;
Aineq(N+Nk+length(Imin)+size(E,1)+1:m, Nk+1:2*Nk) = F(:,[Sum+1:Sum+Nk]);
Aeq = zeros(length(I),2*Nk+N); beq = b(I);
Aeq(:, 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(I,:);
LB = -1e-5*ones(2*Nk+N,1);
UB = 10000*ones(2*Nk+N,1);
x = zeros(2*Nk+N+1,1); E1 = ones(m, 1);
f1 = zeros(2*Nk+N+1,1);
f1(2*Nk+N+1, 1) = -1;
AA = [Aineq E1]; bb = [bineq; 0];
AA = [AA; zeros(1, 2*Nk+N+1)];
AA(m+1, 2*Nk+N+1) = 1;
AAA = [Aeq zeros(size(Aeq,1),1)];
lb = [LB; 0]; ub = [UB; inf];
[x,fval,exitflag2] = linprog(f1, AA, bb, AAA, beq, lb, ub);
X0 = x(1:2*Nk+N,1);
[X,z,exitflag]=fmincon(@obj,X0,Aineq,bineq,Aeq,beq,LB,UB,[],[],Nk,Sum,ck);
if exitflag == 0
error(’fmincon max no. of iterations reached for facet dI = 0’);
end
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z0 = X(1:Nk)’*(X(2*Nk+Sum+1:2*Nk+Sum+Nk)- ck’);
FUNCTION FILE: To find the projection onto suface formed when dJ = 0 for
given J
function [X,zJ,exitflag2] = maxrevJ(Nm, N, A, b, E, f, F, h, p0, k, Nk, J, ck);
Sum = sum(Nm(1:k-1)); K = [Sum+1:Sum+Nk];
Jmin = setdiff([1:N],J); Jbk = J(find(J <= Sum));
Jak = J(find(J >= Sum+Nk+1)); Jabk = [Jbk Jak]; Jk = setdiff(J,Jabk);
m = Nk + N + size(E,1) + size(F,1); Aineq = zeros(m,2*Nk+N);
bineq = [b(K); b(Jmin)];
Aineq(1:Nk, 1:Nk) = eye(Nk);
Aineq(1:Nk, 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(K,:);
Aineq(Nk+1:Nk+length(Jmin), 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(Jmin,:);
if length(Jabk) > 0
Aineq(Nk+length(Jmin)+1:Nk+length(Jmin)+length(Jabk),
Jabk’+2*Nk*ones(length(Jabk),1)) = eye(length(Jabk));
bineq = [bineq; p0(Jabk)];
end
if length(Jk) > 0
Aineq(Nk+length(Jmin)+length(Jabk)+1:Nk+N, [Jk+(Nk-Sum)*ones(1,length(Jk))
Jk+2*Nk*ones(1,length(Jk))]) = [-eye(length(Jk)) eye(length(Jk))];
bineq = [bineq; zeros(length(Jk),1)];
end
bineq = [bineq; f; h-F(:,[1:Sum Sum+Nk+1:N])*[p0(1:Sum); p0(Sum+Nk+1:N)]];
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Aineq(N+Nk+1:N+Nk+size(E,1),1:Nk) = E;
Aineq(N+Nk+size(E,1)+1:m, Nk+1:2*Nk) = F(:,[Sum+1:Sum+Nk]);
Jminabk = [Jmin(find(Jmin <= Sum)) Jmin(find(Jmin >= Sum+Nk+1))];
Jmink = setdiff(Jmin,Jminabk);
Aeq = zeros(N,2*Nk+N); beq = b(J);
Aeq(1:length(J), 2*Nk+1:2*Nk+N) = A(J,:);
if length(Jminabk) > 0
Aeq(length(J)+1: length(J)+ length(Jminabk),
Jminabk’+2*Nk*ones(length(Jminabk),1)) = eye(length(Jminabk));
beq = [beq; p0(Jminabk)];
end
if length(Jmink) > 0
Aeq(length(J)+ length(Jminabk)+1:N, [Jmink+(Nk-Sum)*ones(1,length(Jmink))
Jmink+2*Nk*ones(1,length(Jmink))]) = [-eye(length(Jmink)) eye(length(Jmink))];
beq = [beq; zeros(length(Jmink),1)];
end
LB = zeros(2*Nk+N,1); UB = 10000*ones(2*Nk+N,1);
x = zeros(2*Nk+N+1,1); E1 = ones(m, 1); f1 = zeros(2*Nk+N+1,1);
f1(2*Nk+N+1, 1) = -1; AA = [Aineq E1]; bb = [bineq; 0]; AA = [AA; zeros(1,
2*Nk+N+1)]; AA(m+1, 2*Nk+N+1) = 1;
AAA = [Aeq zeros(size(Aeq,1),1)]; lb = [LB; 0]; ub = [UB; inf];




if exitflag2 == 0
error(’fmincon max no. of iterations reached for dJ = 0’);
end
zJ = X(1:Nk)’*(X(2*Nk+Sum+1:2*Nk+Sum+Nk)- ck’);
This function file is to define the objective function of the formulated optimization
problems in the function files maxrevI and maxrevJ
function [z0] = obj(X,Nk,Sum,ck)
Proceed = 1; temp = 0;
for i = 1:Nk
if X(i) >= 0 temp = temp + X(i)*(X(i+2*Nk+Sum) - ck(i)); end
end
z0 = -temp;
return;
